

Vol. II. Part 2

January 1922

THE
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
PSYCHOLOGY

MEDICAL SECTION

EDITED BY

T. W. MITCHELL

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

WILLIAM BROWN

CONSTANCE LONG

ERNEST JONES

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W. H. R. RIVERS



Cambridge University Press

C. F. CLAY, Manager

LONDON : Fetter Lane, E.C. 4

also

H. K. LEWIS & Co., LTD., 136, Gower Street, London, W.C. 1

CHICAGO : The University of Chicago Press
(Agent for the United States and Canada)

BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, MADRAS : Macmillan and Co., Limited

TOKYO : The Maruzen-Kabushiki-Kaisha

Price Nine Shillings net.

[Issued 14 March, 1922]

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METHODS OF DREAM-ANALYSIS¹.

By W. H. R. RIVERS.

THE conditions under which dreams are recorded and analysed have a great influence upon the results obtained in the analysis. Thus, the doctrines concerning dreams held by Freud, Jung and psycho-analysts generally are greatly affected by the fact that most of the dreams they analyse and make the basis of their theoretical views are obtained in the course of psycho-analysis, i.e. in the course of a long-continued process of a complex and peculiar kind in which there is a special relation, again of a peculiar kind, between the person whose dreams are being analysed and the person who is performing the analysis. Freud has even shown reason to believe² that some of the dreams of his patients have been the outcome of a wish on their part that the views on which their treatment is being based should be shown to be wrong. If factors, such as resistance to the views of the analyst, which enter into the process of psycho-analysis can have an effect of this crude kind, we can be confident that influences of a far more subtle kind, influences less easily detected, must be continually in action, and that, on the whole, the influence of psycho-analysis will be to produce dreams which will tend to confirm the views of those conducting the analysis. We can have little doubt, for instance, that an analyser who believes, or who is generally supposed to believe, that all psycho-neuroses, if not all dreams, are due to disturbance of the sexual instinct will through this belief, or supposed belief, influence the dreams of his patients and, if he is known to hold this belief, he will produce this effect even if he is careful not to refer to sex in any way in the course of his analysis. It is therefore by no means strange that such a physician as Stekel, who believes that the context of nearly all dreams is sexual³ and evidently discusses this belief with his patients, should find sexual motives so prominent in their dreams. We can also be confident that one who is believed by his patients, or his prospective patients, to hold this belief will have a similar effect even if he says or does nothing wittingly during the analysis to confirm the belief. At the same time the converse must be true. There is the similar danger that

¹ Read at a General Meeting of the British Psychological Society, July 23, 1921.

² *Die Traumdeutung*, 5te Auf., Leipzig and Wien, 1919, p. 106 (Brill's translation, p. 127).

³ *Die Sprache des Traumes*, Wiesbaden, 1911, S. 13.

analyses of dreams which take place under the dominant influence of one who disbelieves, or is supposed to disbelieve, in the influence of sex will tend to give results in accordance with this attitude, or supposed attitude, of the analyser.

Again, if wishes concerning the truth or falsity of a theory can have the effect on the dreams of patients which Freud supposes, how far reaching must be the effects which such wishes must have upon the dreams of one who has formulated a theory or has adopted with fervour the theory of another. The self-analysis of dreams must be exposed in equal or even greater measure to the possibility of influences tending to produce dreams which support, or can be utilised in support of, the theory which is dominating the dreamer.

Equally important must be the conditions under which dreams are analysed after they have occurred. It must make a great difference whether the dream is analysed at once or after an interval of hours or days; whether the analysis is carried out by the dreamer himself or by another; whether the incidents of the dream are remembered and recorded before the analysis begins or whether they are only brought to light in the course of the analysis; whether the associations with the dream are left wholly open, whether they start from different selected elements of the manifest content, and whether they are assisted by some special process of word-association. Lastly, and perhaps most important of all, it must make a great difference in the case of analysis by other than the dreamer to how great an extent the analyser intervenes in the process of analysis and tends, perhaps even unwittingly, to direct the course of the thoughts to which the analysis leads.

If dream-analysis is exposed to all these sources of error, and we may take it as certain that their influence cannot be excluded, it becomes of the utmost importance that one who utilises dreams in the study of psychological problems should make it his business to record as fully as possible the conditions under which the dreams he studies have been experienced, recorded and analysed. It becomes equally important that those engaged in the study of dreams should consider fully different methods of record and analysis and should seek to discover procedures which will at least reduce to as small proportions as possible the various sources of error to which dream-analysis is open.

As I am at present engaged in such an attempt to utilise an extensive record both of my own dreams and of the dreams of others, I propose to employ this opportunity in giving an account of my own procedure together with a criticism of the procedure now in vogue among psycho-analysts

as a means of producing criticism of my own procedure and counter-criticism of my remarks on the procedure of others.

In describing my own procedure it is necessary to begin with a feature of my own general psychological experience which has an important bearing on my method of analysing dreams.

For many years I have been the habitual subject of an experience in which, as soon as I become aware that I am awake, I find that I am thinking, and have for some time been thinking, over some problem, usually in connection with the scientific work upon which I am at the time engaged. Many of the scientific ideas which I value most, as well as the language in which they are expressed, have come to me in this half-sleeping, half-waking state directly continuous with definite sleep. When I began to analyse my dreams I frequently had a similar experience in which as soon as I was awake I found that I was already having, and had for some time been having, thoughts about a dream, the dream itself being still clearly in my mind. In some cases it was difficult to say where the dream ended and the unwitting analysis had begun, but a distinction was usually possible owing to my lack of imagery when awake¹. I could be confident that so long as the experience was accompanied by definite imagery it was that of a dream or of a dream-like state, while the period when imagery was absent was one in which I was no longer dreaming, though I had not yet realised that I was awake.

This peculiarity of my experience of the process of awaking introduces a special feature into the records and analyses of my own dreams. There can be little question that the ideal condition for an irreproachable analysis of a dream is one in which the dream is fully recorded before the analysis begins. In this case all danger is avoided that elements derived from, or suggested by, the analysis may be incorporated into the tissue of the dream. In many cases in which I awoke from a dream more or less suddenly I was able to fulfil this ideal condition, but in the frequent cases in which the dream passed insensibly into the half-waking, half-sleeping and unwitting process of analysis, the danger to which I have referred cannot be excluded. The comparison of dreams so analysed, or partially so analysed, with those where the act of awaking was sudden shows, however, that there is little or no difference between them, and I am inclined to regard my unwitting or partially unwitting method of analysis as one especially likely to lead one to the real thoughts and emotions forming the latent content of the dream.

In other cases, after having fully awaked and recorded the dream, I

¹ See *Instinct and the Unconscious*, Cambridge, 1920, p. 11.

would fall into the half-waking, half-sleeping state, and not infrequently it was in this state that the thoughts came which furnished the explanation of the dream. In more than one case this later period of sleepiness passed into one which must be regarded as sleep, for the clue to the nature of the dream came as a definite image. In these cases we may regard the interpretation of a dream as having been furnished by a second dream even though, as matter of fact, this second dream may have consisted only of a single image.

Where the solution of the dream failed to come in this more or less spontaneous way, I adopted the more usual procedure of turning my attention to different elements of the manifest content, allowing any associations so aroused to pass through my mind. I also searched the experience of the day or two before the dream which could have taken part in determining the nature of the manifest content and in some cases found that the experience which had determined the manifest content was of distinct service in the process of finding the deeper meaning of the dream. When I had reached what seemed to me to be the interpretation of the dream I wrote out the analysis as fully as possible and except in a few cases, the exceptions being definitely noted in my records, the complete analysis of the dream had been made and recorded before breakfast on the morning immediately following the dream.

When features of the dream come to mind during the process of analysis I am accustomed to indicate their late coming to mind by enclosing them in brackets, and similarly when elements are added to the analysis after it has been first written out, this is indicated in a similar manner.

So far as I am aware, we have few records of the methods adopted when dreams have been analysed by the dreamers themselves, but so far as can be judged from chance remarks, the method appears in general to be similar to that by which it is customary, and usually necessary, to analyse the dreams of others. At some period of the day following the dream, the dreamer takes different elements of the manifest content and allows his thoughts to rove freely from these starting-points and notes the images and ideas which come into his mind. In other words he imitates as closely as possible the method of free association which it is customary to employ when analysing the dreams of others. We are not told whether the dream is written out before the analysis begins and any further additions clearly distinguished from those already recorded, though it is occasionally mentioned that a feature of the dream only came to mind during the process of analysis. This point is of great importance

in relation to the category of secondary elaboration of which so much use is made by Freud in his theoretical discussions of the dream.

I can now pass to the methods which I have adopted in analysing the dreams of others. I have rarely adopted the usual psycho-analytic procedure in which the patient is made to lie down in the presence of the analyser and started by him upon the process of free association, for I believe that in the majority of persons a state of a hypnoidal kind is thus set up which greatly assists the occurrence of a process of morbid transference. In some cases where I was already well acquainted with the special desires and anxieties of the dreamer the main lines of analysis were already clear as soon as the dream had been related. In such cases I endeavoured by means of guarded inquiries, carefully avoiding leading questions, to ascertain whether this interpretation was justified, and frequently these conversations led me to discover new wishes and anxieties or modifications of those with which I was already acquainted.

In other cases in which the dreamer has adopted a procedure on waking, similar to that followed by myself, I have obtained valuable clues to the meaning of a dream. My method in these cases has been to instruct the patient as far as possible in my own procedure and to make the analysis a matter in which the patient and I are partners.

Before proceeding further I may say that in the majority of cases this process of analysis has led me to wishes, anxieties and conflicts arising out of recent experience which have served to explain, not only the general features of the dream, but also its details. I am ready to acknowledge that a deeper and longer analysis would in many cases have led to earlier and deeper experience, while there can, in my opinion, be no doubt that when the experience of early years has been brought to the surface, or is in course of being brought to the surface during an analysis, desires and conflicts arising out of this experience contribute to the full interpretation of the dream. It seems to me, however, necessary that we should distinguish carefully between certain differences in the subject-matter of dreams which are often confused.

In dealing with this subject I will begin by considering how far the material reached by the customary process of free association can legitimately be held to have taken a necessary part in the causation of the dream. The assumption which underlies the whole construction of Freudian dream-analysis is that the process of free association, starting from an element of the manifest content of a dream, will lead to the discovery of experience which enters into the chain of causation by which the dream has been produced.

I am quite ready to acknowledge that this process leads the analyst

to experience which enables him to understand the state, morbid or otherwise, of the person who is being analysed, and since in many cases this state may have taken part in determining the nature of the dream, the process will, in these cases, give valuable indications of the conditions by which the dream has been produced. It is, however, a purely arbitrary assumption to suppose that every element of experience to which one is led by the process of free association has had a share in the production of the dream except in the very broad sense that behaviour at any moment, waking or sleeping, is determined by the sum-total of the experience of the behavior. Every feature of experience to which one is led by the process of free association may have contributed to the causation of the dream, but it is a pure assumption, and one which needs far firmer foundations than have been provided by the psycho-analysts, that the experience to which free association leads has the importance universally attached to it by the psycho-analytic school.

Except for the practical reason already mentioned, I have no fault to find with the process of free association as an instrument of diagnosis and treatment, or as a means of contributing to the better understanding of the mind or behaviour of the person whose dreams are being analysed, but I need far more evidence than we possess at present to satisfy me that the process of free association starting from an incident of a dream necessarily leads one to experience which has taken any direct part in the causation of the dream, and these doubts become all the stronger, the greater the interval between the dream and the analysis.

I am ready to acknowledge that the special conditions under which dreams are utilised by psycho-analysts should lead to some degree, and perhaps to a considerable degree, of relation between the elements of a dream and experience to which one is led by the process of free association starting from those elements. When the practice of psycho-analysis is in progress from day to day, it is only natural that elements which enter into the causation of dreams should also enter into the chains of association which emerge when an element of a dream is taken as a starting-point. I wish to make clear that I am not objecting to the use of associations starting from an incident of a dream as a process of diagnostic value, while I concede that the special conditions under which dreams are usually analysed by psycho-analysts will probably lead to the presence of a relation, if not a directly causal relation, between an incident of a dream and experience to which the dreamer, starting from that incident, is led by free association¹. My point is one of scientific

¹ In this case the time-interval between dream and analysis will be of no great importance.

rather than of practical method. I am objecting to the view that experience reached by free association starting from an incident of a dream has any necessary connection with the dream, and I believe that the chance of any such connection is especially slight where only a single dream is analysed, or where the interpretation of a dream does not form part of a long-continued process of psycho-analysis.

The criticism which I am now making of the customary psycho-analytic method of dream-analysis has been foreseen and answered by Freud¹, but the answer seems to me far from satisfactory. It reveals a failure to appreciate the difference between the value of free association as a method of psycho-analysis, i.e. as a method of practical diagnosis, and its value as an instrument in the scientific study of the dream. Freud answers the objection I am now making by referring to the congruity of the results reached by the method and their agreement with the results of the treatment of hysterical symptoms, in which case he regards the disappearance of these symptoms as evidence for the correctness of the procedure. Freud then launches out into a defence of his method against a charge, very different from mine, that the chain of association is arbitrary and not strictly determined, and he repels the concept of a chain of thought without a definite end. He assumes that in the process of dream-analysis, this end is necessarily that which has determined the nature and course of the dream.

I have already mentioned one factor which is present whenever the dream of one person is analysed by another. In this case a person takes a part in determining the chain of associations who was not necessarily influential in determining the course of the dream. In this case I am very far from denying that the process of free association is strictly determined. I am only being more thorough in my belief in determinism in that I am including the activity of the analyser, whether witting or unwitting, in the process of determination.

Even when the dream is analysed by the dreamer himself, in which case this extraneous element in the process of determination has been excluded, it is wholly unjustifiable to conclude that thoughts reached by the process of free association have necessarily taken a part in determining the dream. It is necessary here to distinguish between two cases, that in which the associations are formed in the fully waking state and that in which they occur in the half-waking or hypnoidal state. In the

¹ *Die Traumdeutung*, 5te Auflage, Leipzig and Wien, 1919, p. 393 (Brill's translation, p. 418); also *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, Leipzig u. Wien, 1916, p. 108.

former case it is evident that factors will be present during the process of association which were not present in the determination of the dream, and these additional factors will probably be the more numerous and more influential, the greater the interval between the occurrence of the dream and the time of its analysis. If, on the other hand, self-analysis takes place in the half-waking or hypnoidal state, it becomes far more probable that there will be a relation between the thoughts reached by the process of association and those which have determined the dream, but even here we cannot be absolutely confident that the associations will retrace exactly the path which they had previously followed when, according to hypothesis, they were determining the dream. If a period of wakefulness and witting reflection has been allowed to intervene between the dream and the process of analysis, no believer in strict determinism can arbitrarily reject this period as having played no part in the process by which the later associations have been determined, and the chance that this period has had an effect is the greater, the less free the process of analysis is left and the more the self-analyser adopts the artificial method of directing his thoughts to different elements of the manifest dream. The objection I bring against Freud's method of dream-analysis by free association is that it neglects factors which must be acknowledged to play a part if the doctrine of determinism is to hold good. The thoughts associated with a dream are the more likely to lead back to those by which the dream was determined, the more influences of other kinds can be excluded and the less the degree in which witting processes are allowed to intervene. It is for that reason that I believe the orthodox psycho-analytic method to be unsatisfactory and the method by which I have analysed my own dreams to be that best fitted to bring out the nature of the latent content. I have already mentioned that this method may fail to reach a solution and that in such case success may nevertheless be attained by the use of the method of free association starting from incidents of the dream. Moreover, analysis by another person may succeed where self-analysis has failed. I do not regard my own method as infallible or of universal application, but as one which is free from certain sources of error which must accompany the application of the orthodox psycho-analytic procedure. The assumption upon which my method depends is that the latent thoughts which have determined the nature of a dream during sleep continue to be active on awaking, especially when this waking is only partial, and that the period between sleeping and waking provides the fittest opportunity for the discovery of these thoughts.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE WAR NEUROSIS¹.

By GERALD H. FITZGERALD.

Now that three years have elapsed since the conclusion of hostilities, we are in a position to appraise with some degree of accuracy the claims of the war neurosis to be considered as a separate entity. I think that most of us would agree that in a very large number of our cases the underlying factors differ in no marked respect from those encountered in civilian life. It is obvious—leaving aside for the moment one highly important factor, the danger to life—that the unrestrained expression of sadistic instincts must have produced a conflict with which the Ego, enfeebled perhaps by disease and most certainly by the strain of warfare, could scarcely deal. In ill-adapted individuals the segregation from the opposite sex resulted in a reinforcement of the homosexuality sufficient to cause a neurosis, whilst others of tougher mould resorted openly to perverted practices. The attitude to authority again is of self-evident importance. In men who broke down whilst training or after some trifling trauma, the ultimate prognosis is naturally far worse than in those whose neurosis only declared itself after a year or more of exposure to the rigours of the field.

In a different class, however, are the fortunately more numerous type where the constitutional factor is negligible and whose final breakdown is manifestly caused by the unparalleled ordeal of modern warfare.

A frequent history to be obtained is that they carried on well, although perhaps growing progressively more 'windy' and rather less inclined to take risks, until one day some relatively trifling occurrence completely upset their balance. From that moment they became helpless either to lead or to execute commands; and this, I think, is significant: they had a compelling certainty that every shell and bullet they heard was destined for them. The opposing belief in the immortality of the Ego was well expressed by the Tommy's dictum that the shell that was going to get you had your number on it.

Or perhaps a single violent shock, a shell-burst or burial alive may have precipitated the neurosis, although the man had not previously

¹ Read before the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, 14th Dec. 1921.

noticed any untoward symptoms. These alone are the cases which aetio-logically are to be classified as traumatic neurosis.

Let us consider as briefly as may be the psychopathology of this condition. The possibility of an underlying sexual factor in the war neurosis has of course been vehemently denied, nor, if we limit sexuality to the sense of object love, would it be possible to demonstrate a 'denial of love,' a damming up of the libido sufficient to provoke the flight into disease.

But by a quite legitimate enlargement of the libido concept so as to include not only the love-energy directed upon the outside world, but also that attached to the Ego itself, we can readily appreciate how any force tending to endanger the Ego and threaten its continued existence acts in its effects as an impediment to self love. All the libido is originally narcissistic, and it is only during cultural development that it becomes detached and capable of being utilized as object libido through transference formation. But this detachment is only partial, and the old channels exist whereby it is capable of flowing back to its original fixation point in the primitive narcissism.

The Ego senses keenly an impoverishment for which nothing can adequately compensate; the patient is again in the position of the infant dependent entirely upon the care of its mother, deriving narcissistic gratification by identification of itself with its first love object; and those whose presence tends to disturb this sense of security are regarded with bitter hostility.

The symptoms of the traumatic neurosis,—the deep-rooted sense of injury and injustice, the desire that others should occupy themselves exclusively with their wellbeing, the intolerance of the children whose presence interferes with the wife's exclusive preoccupation with the husband,—are, as Abraham has pointed out, efforts at reassertion on the part of the injured narcissism. The extent of this regression to an earlier psychic level was well seen in many war cases soon after the traumatic event where the patient's behaviour corresponded to that of a little child, needing to be fed and tended, and showing the emotional reactions of the first years of life. The comparative frequency of cases of so-called traumatic epilepsy in which the patient develops fits of an epileptic type after some physical trauma, fits which cannot be attributed to any manifest organic lesion, with the characteristic mental traits of the civilian epileptic, selfishness, egocentricity, impulsive gratification of desires, marks, I think, a similar regressive state, though here the individual was probably before his breakdown ill-adapted to reality, and liable to violent emotional outbursts.

The regression motive is well seen in the recurring dream of a ranker officer whose breakdown developed gradually after three years of strenuous service, following on a severe conflict as to the morality of shooting a German from behind who had turned tail and was running back to his own trenches. He began to develop the feeling already described, that every shell was coming directly for him. Gradually he became less and less able to lead his men in the field, was haunted by fears of cowardice, and finally the explosion of a Jack Johnson nearly knocked the wind out of him and he developed nervous symptoms which necessitated his evacuation. After some months of psychological treatment during which he steadily improved, he dreamt of an earthquake, which at once revived the memory, hitherto repressed, of the explosion; a moderate abreaction followed. On his next visit he produced the following dream: "*There seemed to be an earthquake and I saw the earth open up all around me. There were numberless corpses in their coffins, and the earthquake dislodged the lids. The coffins seemed to rise up out of the ground.*"

On analysis the dream revealed obsessive fears of an earthquake, hurricane, or some such cataclysm of nature which would wipe out the town where he lived, leaving only himself alive. The primitive symbolism of the return to an intra-uterine state and subsequent rebirth is of course clear. This opened up a level of thought hitherto untouched wherein he himself was omnipotent, triumphantly directing the forces of destruction which formed the content of his phobias.

The repetition of the dream after the effect of the original event had been abreacted, and its elaboration in the services of the infantile wish mark, I think, the process of absorption of a traumatically effective stimulus into the general body of the unconscious. This is a point of great theoretical significance and one which, if we succeed in elucidating it further, will lead us far in our examination of the war neurosis. The tendency to recurrence of the war dream, with its culminating moment from which the sleeper awakes shaking with terror, has long been a stumbling-block to the acceptance of the Freudian theories of wish fulfilment. But, on examination, one finds that whereas some war dreams are subject to the usual laws regulating dream activity, others, though a small proportion, repeat themselves throughout long periods with apparently no change of content. These recurring dreams may be, and usually are, exact reproductions of the traumatic moment, though in a much rarer class we have dreams with an elaborate symbolism which throughout numberless repetitions never alter in any particular.

It would seem as if the unconscious were powerless to mould them

or alter their rigid character; the driving affect paralyses psychic activity, leading the dreamer night after night along the same road, repeating with monotonous certainty the well-worn paths till he awakes sweating with horror, and dreading the return of sleep. Their very rigidity of structure makes them valueless as analytic material.

From the start the dreamer can tell one everything or nothing; the dream may be, and generally is, a photographic reproduction of a traumatic event of which the dreamer is fully cognizant and of which he can speak on the reality level with no notable emotion. In other cases a puzzling symbolization has taken place which leads the dreamer back surely enough to the traumatic moment, but whose elements do not allow of fractional interpretation. The structure here, too, is fixed and unyielding. In one case I was able, under hypnosis, to convert the dream to a hysterical pain, which apparently provided a sufficient outlet, for it never returned.

If distortion occurs it is, as would be expected, in the service of the wish fulfilment and indicates a partial psychic binding of the traumatic affect. This factor is well shown in the following recurrent dream for which I am indebted to Dr Devine. "*I was in the square at Cambrai, the Germans were shelling heavily, as one burst near me I awoke.*" This immediately recalled an incident of which the patient had a full conscious recollection, but careful cross-examination revealed the following significant dream distortion—*there was glass in the windows of all the houses.*

This, he agreed, was a manifest impossibility. The dream wish, therefore, had endeavoured to reassure him of his safety by placing the scene of the bombardment miles behind the line.

Let us consider a few cases in which no such alteration is perceptible.

W. P., a patient of poor intelligence suffering from vague dreads, stammer, broken sleep, in which he constantly lives over a period of horror when he lay buried beneath a fall of earth in the trenches. He tells me of this without marked emotion and of the amnesia following; his next recollection is of hospital in England.

I lay him down and direct him to close his eyes and to take his thoughts back to the time in question. He does so, and in a few moments we have him reacting briskly, gasping and shuddering as the shells burst in his neighbourhood, shouting to his comrades, till finally the trench falls in, and he tells me in broken gasps of the weight pressing on his chest, his efforts to escape, and finally with a convulsive heave he frees himself and sits up. "What happened?" I ask, and he explains that he scarcely knows, he seemed to get free somehow. Thus far we have the

abreaction method on orthodox lines. The man has, we say, freed himself of the affective disturbance by a repetition in consciousness.

But at our next sitting he reports that the dream is still disturbing him. The incident has evidently been insufficiently abreacted. Again he is directed to think of it and gives a repetition identical in every respect to the preceding. The affair drags on; week after week the abreaction takes place, with no less certainty does the dream return. Growing desperate, I try the fatigue method. Three times in one morning does the unhappy patient free himself from his living grave, and the no less unhappy abreactionist is faced with the collapse of all his cherished theories. The patient was eventually discharged from treatment, and is, I should think, probably repeating his nightly excavation to this day. It must be remembered that we were dealing here with a man of poor mentality whose powers of absorption were probably very small. A happier issue attended the following:

S. H. W. A tough, pre-war soldier aged 44, complaining much of sleeplessness, nightmares, and impairment of memory. He talked little of the war, but when he did he laughed about it. Two frequently recurring dreams disturbed his sleep. The first related to a definite incident in which he and a German grappled in No Man's Land, the German grasping him by the throat and endeavouring to drown him in the mud. Eventually as he was at his last gasp, something alarmed the German and he made off towards his own lines.

At the outset of treatment the point at which the patient awoke was always that at which the German was drowning him. He was made to talk over the affair, but there was little or no reaction; he fully realized the horror of the situation, but although it could be vividly recalled there was no perceptible distress.

Imbued, as I then was, with a belief in the theory of auto-suggestion as the factor producing hysterical perpetuation of symptoms, it occurred to me that a repetition of this kind might perhaps be analogous to the persistence of deaf-mutism, so often seen in soldiers after a shell-burst. Symptoms such as this were of course readily removable by persuasion, coupled with an explanation of their mechanism adapted to the patient's intelligence.

I therefore explained to the patient that the return of the dream was conditioned by his belief in the inevitableness of the repetition, that if he could rid his mind of this certainty, etc., he would be troubled no more. Next week he reported that the dream had certainly recurred, but missed out the crucial incident; he simply found himself lying in

the mud, and the German walking back to his lines. He awoke laughing. After this there was no repetition.

The second dream proved more obdurate. As he lay in bed he heard footsteps mounting the stairs, someone went into his son's room, there was a blow and the thud of a body falling on the floor. He awoke regularly, sweating and terrified. For some sittings nothing could be elicited, but at our eighth interview he recalled a singularly unpleasant experience when a number of Germans were murdered in cold blood. The thud he associated with the felling of an officer with a rifle-butt. For three weeks, under persuasive methods, the dream disappeared, but recurred under the stress of a domestic anxiety. The inhibitions had, however, become so far removed that he was able, on hearing the footsteps to say, "It's only a dream." Nevertheless he felt impelled to leap out of bed and visit his son's room to reassure himself that the lad was safe. The dream crossed his mind subsequently in sleep on a few occasions, but the anxiety vanished. It is evident that we are dealing here with a dream which, although recurrent, has at the outset effected a partial fusion with unconscious material. Nevertheless, its employment in the services of the dream wish was far from satisfactory. The compelling force of its affect rendered it incapable of distortion and elaboration; it could be utilized only to express in a crude and violent manner a danger situation which provoked in the dreamer not surprise or sorrow, the normal response to such an apparent death wish, but only feelings of alarm which called forth a reaction of self-preservation. In the threat to his child, he sees a threat to his Ego, and responds to it in narcissistic fashion by a compulsion to reassure himself that all is well.

A third case presents another and more complex aspect. H. F., a man of 46, an obvious martial misfit, a small unambitious clerk, employed in a subordinate position with the same firm for sixteen years. After a short time at the front he was blown up and buried, and for some hours lay practically covered with *debris*, and in great terror lest he should be left there forgotten. Two dreams relating to this incident occurred regularly and had done so for over two years, accompanied with much painful emotion. Although rather long they are worth quoting *in extenso*, to show how an elaborate symbolism such as they exhibit can nevertheless take on a stereotyped and rigid character, which altered not at all despite numberless repetitions.

Dream I. *In the dark I came to a kind of structure and as I looked into it I saw that the only light came from above. I looked up and saw a man at work. My first thought was to reach him. There was no other means*

but by climbing through different floors which could be seen through, they being a kind of lattice work interwoven, after the pattern of bed laths. In some way or other I reached the first obstacle in my endeavour to get to the top, but as I grasped the laths they began to bend, so much so that in my frightened state I thought they would break and I should drop. Each floor I climbed through seemed more difficult, the laths bending more as I got nearer the top. I had come to the last floor and was almost at the top when the laths bent to the point of breaking. At that moment I woke up feeling bad.

Dream II. I found myself in a vault and as I groped about in the darkness I found that my only way out was up a kind of chute, but to my amazement I could not ascend it, for a massive stone barred the way. Persons above were trying to rescue me and several attempts were made with chains and ropes fastened round the stone, but every time the stone got hauled up about halfway, the chains and ropes broke and down came the stone again. In my terrified state, thinking I must remain there and die, I saw around me many skeletons of persons who had met a similar fate to that which faced me. At the point of giving up hope of being rescued, I awoke.

It would seem almost as if the unconscious in the interests of the primary dream function—the preservation of sleep—had succeeded by a supreme effort in effecting just so much disguise—or, from a standpoint which we shall consider later, in attracting to itself and fixing a certain measure of the traumatic affect, but was powerless to utilize it in any further way.

The unconscious impulses which attain their expression in the dream we are accustomed to consider as under the dominance of the Pleasure Principle; but here we seem to see them set aside, and mastered in their turn by something which appears more primitive—or at least more powerful, the *compulsion to repeat*. Let us attempt a theoretical explanation of these problems.

We have already seen that in the traumatic neurosis it is the libido attached to the Ego itself that is, through the agency of a violent threat to the continued existence of the individual, withdrawn from the outer world, and regresses to infantile modes of expression.

But many of these infantile reactions become in the course of cultural development obsolete and forbidden modes of expression and cannot be tolerated by the Ego, which through its adaptation to the Reality Principle feels them to be inimical to its safety. Thus sexual hunger, whether it be that caused by the damming back of Object or of Ego libido, causes a tension within the psyche which can only be relieved by the production of morbid anxiety (*Angst*). This morbid anxiety the Ego

tends to project as if the threat came from without—a point which we shall consider in more detail later—and to guard itself against it by the formation of various phobias and prohibitions, which serve as defence mechanisms against the formation of morbid anxiety. The morbid fear of the soldier on the battlefield is in a certain sense as truly a neurotic symptom as that of the woman seized with terror at the sight of a cat. For as Jones¹ has shown, the normal response to danger is a conation—flight, defence or retaliation. The production of morbid fear is in no sense a useful reaction, for it serves by its very intensity to inhibit motor activity, to drain off all psychic energy into one unbearable emotion. Thus far we are on familiar ground. Morbid anxiety is the state of awaiting danger, and differs from fear in so far as the individual is unable to react by the appropriate conation. It seems probable that the measure of *Angst* production is the extent to which the conative response has been ineffective or inadequate.

But a danger totally unprepared for causes neither fear nor *Angst* but alarm [*Shreck*], the suddenness allows no time for preparation or motor activity; the psyche appears transfixed by the sudden impact of the stimulus. It is in these cases that one encounters the phenomenon of the recurrent dream.

We have now two problems to consider. Can this repetition of the traumatic moment be in any sense a function of the Pleasure Principle, which we have hitherto regarded as paramount in the psychic life of the unconscious; and what are the mechanisms whereby a psychic trauma tends constantly to repeat itself with fresh affective force?

Freud, in his earliest essays on the problem of hysteria, formulated the concept that the hysteric *suffered from reminiscences* and showed how a stimulus of a certain intensity experienced in early childhood was repeated in a disguised form throughout life as a neurotic symptom. When the affect attached to this stimulus was brought up to consciousness the patient abreacted it, and by this means was enabled to obtain relief. It appears, of course, regularly during analytic treatment in the phenomena of the transference.

The instincts are the richest source of stimuli reaching the consciousness from within, and we may venture the supposition that the stimuli arising from them have not the characteristics of fixed nervous energy but that which is freely flowing and seeks an outlet. To their free state they owe the power of combining in the foreconscious with the day remnants, which as it were fix them. It is only then that they can be

¹ *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, pp. 578 et seq.

utilized by the Pleasure Principle, which owing to this psychic binding can obtain the mastery and submit them to elaboration, according to the laws of the unconscious. If this fixation fails, as not infrequently happens with the psychic traumata of childhood, a derangement analogous to a traumatic neurosis results, even though the event itself has never become conscious. But this 'compulsion to repeat' (*wiederholungs-zwang*), which has well been compared to a conditioned reflex, does not function in opposition to the Pleasure Principle but independently of it. During the course of a psycho-analytic cure, it is evident that the force compelling the patient to repeat through the transference the repressed remnants of his early memories is not held in fixation, and although not necessarily unpleasant—it may, for example, result in the repetition of a disguised erotic situation—functions without regard to the Pleasure Principle. When, as in the examples we have considered, the memories revived are of a kind which contain no possibility of pleasure, the individual appears as if a diabolic fate pursued him, from which there is no possibility of escape.

In a recent work of some difficulty¹, Freud has devoted fuller attention to this abrogation of the Pleasure Principle, in favour of what appears to be a more primitive tendency of the psychic life, and it will be of value to consider his speculations concerning the nature and functions of this compelling force.

Two salient characteristics at once seize our attention—the moment of surprise and terror, the importance of which has already been considered; and the well-known fact that a wound received at the same time serves to protect against the formation of a neurosis. But if one thinks it self-evident that the nightly dream takes the patient back to the traumatic moment, as a measure, as it were, of its force, one mistakes the true nature of the dream, whose function should be to bring him back to health and the hoped for cure.

Either we must postulate a little understood masochism, or, as we have already done, a weakness in the dream structure.

In a brief discussion of the motives actuating the imitative games of childhood, Freud demonstrates that the child by substituting an active for a passive *rôle* strives to render itself master of events which have produced a lively impression upon it. These events are not necessarily pleasant in themselves, as, for example, the familiar games of doctors and patients, and one may assume that the gain of pleasure is secondary to the impulse to abreact the incident. May it not be that this impulse

¹ S. Freud, *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*.

towards mastery by repetition is the underlying motive of the compulsion to repeat?

Psycho-analytic theory assumes that consciousness is only a special function of the psyche, regarding it indeed as comparable to an end organ. But, since the system of perceptual consciousness is capable of receiving impressions both from without and of pain and pleasure from within, we must, if we accord to it a spatial relation, regard it as being directed outwards and encompassing the other psychic systems. If, however, it is to retain its function as a receptor, it cannot preserve within itself the results of such impressions as a permanent trace, for to do so would render it increasingly less fitted to receive new stimuli and transform them into consciousness. Memory traces are formed by the propagation of the impulse to the next inner system, and the phenomenon of becoming conscious (*Bewustwerden*) is the product of a transformation of a memory trace into the moment of exposure in consciousness, that is to say of its direct communication with the outer world. Using as an illustration a small ball of protoplasm in the midst of a world full of violent energies, Freud discusses the effect that a constant bombardment of stimuli would have upon it. The outer layers would tend to become specially modified to serve as a receptor, and stimuli would pass through it without resistance and producing no permanent change in its structure. But the stimulus in passing from the outer to the inner layers has to surmount an obstacle and in its passage leaves a permanent trace.

The unimpeded passage of stimuli might, however, result in injury to the organism, and thus it would happen that the outermost layer loses its living structure, becomes as it were inorganic and acts as a special membrane, which preserves the organism from the forces of the outer world, in such a way that they only penetrate the inner layers with a portion of their energies. The outermost layer has by its death protected the inner layers, provided the stimuli are not sufficiently powerful to force a passage. This layer or barrier, which Freud has called the *Reizschutz*, is provided with an energy of its own, and serves above all to preserve the organism from the effects of dangerous stimuli in the outer world. The receptor within seeks to recognize the force, the intention and the nature of the excitations which reach it from outside. For this it suffices to take small amounts of energy and examine them. Thus in the process of evolution the central nervous system has gradually withdrawn from its exposed position as the primitive ectoderm and those portions of it remaining on the surface, the sense organs, adapted for the reception of specific stimuli, are capable of receiving only very

small amounts of energy, so that one might compare them to antennae, which but touch the outer world, to be immediately withdrawn.

We have seen that our little ball is protected by the *Reizschutz* from the outer world, and that the next inner layer must serve as a receptor. This becomes later the organ of consciousness and on account of its position on the frontier between the inner and the outer world serves also to differentiate between stimuli arising from one or the other. But stimuli from without reach it only in small quantity, for their passage is impeded by the *Reizschutz*, whereas those from within can reach it in undiminished force, and thus tend to be more effective. If these inner stimuli reach a degree sufficient to cause pain, so as to constitute a threat to the Ego, the tendency is to treat them as if coming from the exterior. In this way the barrier of the *Reizschutz* may be used against them. *This is the mechanism of Projection.*

Stimuli from the outside strong enough to effect a penetration of the *Reizschutz* become traumatic. The overwhelming of the psyche by a great flood of stimuli must in some way be impeded. What reaction in the psychic life can follow such a penetration of the *Reizschutz*? All the defence mechanisms of the organism are called into play. The problem is to control the stimuli and effect a discharge. From every side the energy belonging to the organism is gathered up to form at the point broken through a counter-charge of energy, and on this account all the other psychic systems are impoverished or paralysed. The counter-charge thus formed serves to bind the incoming stimulus and in so doing is transformed from freely flowing energy to energy at rest. If the shock be sudden the tension at the point of entry will be low and the penetration of the *Reizschutz* therefore relatively more easy. On the other hand, if there has been a preparation by morbid anxiety for shock with the consequent formation of a counter-charge of energy in the systems nearest to the threatened point, the penetration will be more difficult or even impossible. Morbid anxiety forms, therefore, the last line of defence of the *Reizschutz*. Above a certain strength of trauma, however, it matters little whether a system be prepared by anxiety or no.

The dreams following trauma of an overwhelming sort seek therefore to achieve the mastery of the excitation by the development of anxiety, whose lack has been the cause of the neurosis. In this sense they may be regarded as an attempt at cure by a psychic binding of the invading stimulus.

The fact already referred to that a physical injury received at the same time prevents the development of a traumatic neurosis can be

explained if one considers that the surplus excitations received through a penetration of the *Reizschutz* are fixed by means of a narcissistic conversion on the part of the injured organ. It becomes thus a love object, and the stimulus in a sense transformed to object-libido. The well-known satisfaction of men who had received 'A Blighty one' and the happy atmosphere prevailing in Surgical Hospitals is thus comprehensible in terms of the libido theory.

As this transference weakens with the healing of the wound, a neurosis may develop, or the Ego strive to protect itself from the release of the attached energy by a hysterical continuance of impaired function. One is often struck in the gymnasium attached to the London Neurological Clinic by the extreme content of the men with their crippling functional disabilities. Nor can the resistance against cure be regarded as other than a protection against the results of the release of energy from its satisfactory fixation—that is, against the development of morbid anxiety. Abreaction would, therefore, seem to be effective in so far as it aids in the fixation process by the deliberate production of *Angst*, against which the patient has opposed the resistances of the Ego, conscious and foreconscious.*

Considerations of space have compelled me to omit all reference to the close parallelism between the concept of a profound narcissistic regression and the return, from a physiological standpoint, to the phylogenetically earlier biochemical control of function by the endocrines.

It is significant, however, that those cases of traumatic neurosis whose symptoms most clearly resemble a pure hyperthyroidism react unfavourably to psycho-therapy. For the extent of the regression measures, in some respects, the prospect of ultimate recovery.

EXPERIMENTS ON THE ASSOCIATION TEST AS A CRITERION OF INDIVIDUALITY.

BY W. WHATELY SMITH.

THE object of the experiments described below was to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the distribution of affective tone evoked in the course of a word-association test is uniquely characteristic of the subject concerned. For reasons which I shall give later I consider this question to be of considerable importance.

In order to investigate the point, I induced six subjects to undergo repeated tests:

Subject P 1 was tested on 6 occasions

" P 2	"	8	"
" P 3	"	8	"
" P 4	"	6	"
" P 5	"	10	"
" P 6	"	6	"

The general procedure was substantially the same as that described in my paper on Memory and Affective Tone¹, but I did not take reaction times and relied solely on the psycho-galvanic-reflex as a measure of the affective tone evolved. I did this partly because I believe the reflex to be far more reliable than reaction time² and partly because I wished, for external reasons, to shorten, as much as possible, both the experiments themselves and the subsequent calculations.

I also made certain changes in the list of words used. It is obvious that to use a list containing any considerable number of words likely to arouse intense affective tone in *all* subjects would tend to obscure the individual differences which I was anxious to investigate. The ideal would be to use a list containing only words of no universal interest which would, therefore, only evoke affective tone by virtue of their associations with experiences peculiar to the individual; but this is scarcely practicable.

As an approximation to this I deleted from my original list the 20 words which, in my previous experiments, had aroused the most intense

¹ *British Journal of Psychology*, General Section, Jan. 1921, p. 236.

² *British Journal of Psychology*, Medical Section, Vol. I, p. 293 *seq.*

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affective tone in subjects as a whole. These, in the order in which they appeared in my original list, were:

Woman, Dance, Proud, Habit, Pray, Money, Despise, War, Child, Marry, Fight, Family, Name, Afraid, Love, Kiss, State, Happy, Wound, Divorce.

I replaced these by the following 20 words which I judged less likely to arouse intense affective tone in the average subject:

Window, Pay, Mountain, Justice, Hat, Paint, Wild, Month, Brown, Dog, Help, Apple, Waste, Fast, Purpose, Knife, House, Coal, Fire, Hotel.

The list then ran as follows:

Head	Blue	Frog	Wait
Green	Lamp	Try	Cow
Water	Carry	Hunger	Waste
Sing	Bread	White	Luck
5. Dead	30. Rich	55. Brown	80. Horse
Long	Tree	Speak	Table
Ship	Jump	Pencil	Work
Make	Pity	Sad	Brother
Window	Yellow	Plum	Fast
10. Friend	35. Street	60. Dog	85. Purpose
Cook	Bury	Home	Chair
Ask	Salt	Nasty	Worry
Cold	Dress	Glass	Knife
Stalk	Justice	Help	Motor
15. Pay	40. Hat	65. Wine	90. Clean
Village	Paint	Big	Bag
Pond	Silly	Carrot	Choice
Sick	Book	Give	Bed
Mountain	Wild	Doctor	House
20. Bring	45. Finger	70. Travel	95. Coal
Ink	Month	Flower	Shut
Angry	Bird	Beat	Fire
Needle	Walk	Box	Evil
Swim	Paper	Old	Hotel
25. Go	50. Wicked	75. Apple	100. Insult

Each time that I tested a given subject I called out the words of the list in a different order. Thus I first gave them in the order shown above; next backwards; then in the order 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . 99, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . 100; for the third test I used the order 100, 98, 96, . . . 2, 99, 97, 95, . . . 1; and similar systematic alterations of order were made for each test.

There were several reasons for doing this. In the first place I wished to eliminate, as far as possible, any effects due to preselection, and reversing the order of the words is calculated to do this to some extent.

Secondly, I feared that if I always used the same order the subjects would soon begin to remember which word was coming next, and this would be apt to interfere with the success of the experiment. Thirdly, some subjects have a tendency to 'settle down' in the course of the experiment and to give smaller reactions towards the end than at the beginning, while others behave in the opposite way.

By varying the order of the words such sources of error can be minimised.

In order to eliminate the danger of the results being unduly influenced by tests, the absolute magnitude of whose reactions might happen to be abnormally large or small, I adopted the same 'percentage method' which I used in my experiments on nonsense syllables. That is to say, I expressed each reaction as a percentage of the arithmetic mean of the series to which it belonged; each series, therefore, was of equal weight in determining the final results no matter what the absolute magnitude of its mean reaction might be.

The tests on each subject were carried out at intervals of two or three days.

In order to ascertain the average consistency of individual subjects—the extent, that is to say, to which an individual's reactions on one occasion resembled his reactions on another—I divided the tests for each subject into two equal groups, taking the first three, four or five tests, as the case might be, as one group and the last three, four or five as the other group. Thus for subject P 1 the first group consisted of tests 1, 2 and 3 and the other of tests 4, 5 and 6, while for subject P 5 one group consisted of tests 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and the other of tests 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

In each such group I computed the mean percentage reaction for each word in the series. For example:

Subject No. P 1

Reactions as percentages of their respective means.

Word	1st Test	2nd Test	3rd Test	Mean of 1, 2 and 3	4th Test	5th Test	6th Test	Mean of 4, 5 and 6	Mean of all tests
Head	86	0	0	29	0	55	71	42	35
Green	10	0	0	3	0	0	71	24	14
Water	0	65	0	22	0	0	0	0	11
Sing	76	0	0	25	0	0	0	0	12
Dead	257	588	145	330	254	276	213	248	289
etc.									

I also calculated the mean percentage-reaction for all the tests, as shown above.

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In order to ascertain what kind of effect is produced by using the means of two such groups of tests for each subject, instead of relying on a single pair of tests, and thus to gain some idea of how many tests it would be desirable to use in order to obtain reliable results in future work of this nature, I worked out the coefficients of correlation between the deflections given by the first test and the second test respectively in the case of each subject. The results were:

Correlation:

First and second test for P 1 + .69		
"	"	P 2 + .39
"	"	P 3 + .18
"	"	P 4 + .44
"	"	P 5 + .35
"	"	P 6 - .01
Mean ...		+ .36

If these values are compared with those obtained from the correlation of the means of the groups it will be seen that the effect of taking the mean of several tests as a basis of calculation is greatly to increase the correlation and to eliminate the discrepancies between individuals.

I next calculated the coefficient of correlation between the means of the two groups (M_1 and M_2) for each subject and obtained the following figures:

Correlation:

First group (M_1) with second group (M_2) for P 1 + .98		
"	"	P 2 + .72
"	"	P 3 + .70
"	"	P 4 + .60
"	"	P 5 + .68
"	"	P 6 + .42

The mean of these coefficients of correlations is + .68. If they be weighted in proportion to the number of observations on which each is based the weighted mean is + .685.

This value is important; it is the mathematical expression of the extent to which an average subject agrees with himself, so to speak, over a period of the duration here involved (*i.e.* about 3-4 weeks).

The next step was to ascertain the extent to which subjects agree with each other. To ascertain this I worked out the coefficient of correlation between the mean percentage-reactions of all tests (M_3) for each subject with every other subject. The resulting figures were:

Mean of P 1 (all tests) with mean of P 2 (all tests) + .19						
"	P 1	"	"	P 3	"	- .02
"	P 1	"	"	P 4	"	+ .12
"	P 1	"	"	P 5	"	- .01
"	P 1	"	"	P 6	"	+ .02
"	P 2	"	"	P 3	"	+ .15
"	P 2	"	"	P 4	"	+ .19
"	P 2	"	"	P 5	"	+ .18
"	P 2	"	"	P 6	"	+ .01
"	P 3	"	"	P 4	"	+ .46
"	P 3	"	"	P 5	"	+ .14
"	P 3	"	"	P 6	"	- .24
"	P 4	"	"	P 5	"	+ .23
"	P 4	"	"	P 6	"	- .04
"	P 5	"	"	P 6	"	- .13

The mean of these values is + .08. If they be weighted in proportion to the product of the number of observations on which each series correlated is based the weighted mean is + .09.

It will be noticed that with one exception (subject P 3 with P 4)¹ the correlation between any two subjects is very markedly lower than that between the two groups of any single individual subject. This is what we should expect on general grounds; for, if we eliminate words of universal appeal from the list, the affective state evoked by any word in a given subject must be a product of that subject's personal experience: and the experience of every individual is unique.

In accordance with the ordinary laws of probability we should expect to find certain proportions of abnormally high and low values in each class of correlation (*i.e.* 'individuals with themselves' and 'individuals with each other') but the majority of values in each should approximate to the mean. We thus find the very high value of + .98, for subject P 1, and the very low value of + .42, for subject P 6, in the first class; and the very high value of + .46, for subjects P 3 and P 4, in the second.

If we had at our disposal a sufficiently large number of values to give us the frequency distributions of values in the two classes we should doubtless obtain two overlapping curves of the approximate form shown in Fig. 1.

The one would have its maximum at approximately + .7, the other at about + .1. The precise position of the maximum would depend, *inter alia*, upon the number of words of universal appeal which the list contained. If there were none the maximum of the dotted curve would be exactly at 0 and it would, presumably, be symmetrical, while that of

¹ This is almost wholly due to two words, 'sad' and 'waste,' which greatly excited both subjects: without these the figure would be about + .09.

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the full curve would be at about $+ \cdot 6$. Any increase in the number of universally exciting words would shift the maxima towards the right and, incidentally, bring them closer together; for if the list were composed exclusively of 'universal' words the element of individuality would *ex hypothesi* be eliminated and the curves would coincide with a maximum at $+ 1\cdot 0$, becoming vertical straight lines in the process.

From such curves it would be possible to calculate the precise chance that a given coefficient of correlation between two series of reactions of unknown origin arose from correlating the reactions of the same individual or of two different individuals.

For practical purposes, however, such refinements are unnecessary; we may say with considerable assurance that in general the correlation of individuals with themselves is about $+ \cdot 60$ to $+ \cdot 70$ while the correla-




Fig. 1

tion between different individuals is not likely to be greater than $+ \cdot 2$. The relevance of this conclusion to possible future investigations will be dealt with later.

It is necessary to give, at this stage, a few observations as to the experimental conditions under which this work was done and the probable reliability of the results obtained. I experienced a good deal of difficulty from cold weather which prevailed during part of the work and which was aggravated by the coal strike. I found that when subjects were cold and their skins dry and contracted they generally gave unsatisfactory reactions. Sometimes they refused to react at all and I was obliged to discontinue and to postpone several tests on this account. When they did react they generally gave very small deflections with a distinct tendency towards an 'all-or-none' type of reaction. That is to say they

would give long runs of very small deflections, or of none at all, with what seemed to be disproportionately large deflections for such few words as produced more than this minimal response. The effect of this is somewhat to increase the tendency of subjects to correlate highly with themselves and only slightly with each other, but I consider that this is at least discounted by the fact that such relatively unsatisfactory series of reactions appeared to be much more erratic than the more satisfactory series. Several of the tests in this experiment were as good as any I have observed and I received the strong impression that these 'conformed to type,' for any subject, much more closely than did the less good tests. That is to say I anticipated large reactions on words which had previously excited the subject with far greater confidence when the test was one of first class reliability than I did when it was not.

My opinion is that, in so far as the experimental conditions were adverse (and of course I never continued a test unless it was reasonably satisfactory), the effects very approximately cancelled each other, tending on the one hand to accentuate and on the other to diminish both the agreement of individuals with themselves and their lack of agreement with each other. This opinion is, of course, purely subjective, but it is based on a fairly extensive experience of using the galvanometer in conjunction with word-association tests and I have little doubt as to the reliability of the results obtained. Provided the tests are reasonably numerous and spread over a period of not more than a month, and that a suitable list of words is used, individuals will, in general, show a correlation with themselves of not less than $+ .6$ and, with each other, of not more than $+ .2$. (There will, of course, on the theory of probability, always be an occasional exception, as already pointed out.)

I may now pass to what I conceive to be the potential value of this method. I consider that it is likely to prove useful in the investigation of those phenomena of 'dissociation' and 'multiple personality,' in which whole tracts of experience, so to speak, appear to become detached from, and to function independently of, the main mass of experience which determines the 'normal' personality. There are, roughly speaking, two alternative views as to the kind of process which results in these conditions. On the one hand they are regarded as no more than special cases of the general process of 'repression,' differing only from other instances of the same process in the extent and sharp delimitation of the mass of experiences repressed and in the intensity of the repression. On the other hand it is suggested that some special process comes into play—a process distinct *sui generis* from anything operative in the normal mind—

and that, as a result of this, the experiences concerned are actually, in some fashion, split off from the main mass and segregated, so to speak, into a water-tight compartment of their own. According to this view they are inactive, incapable of exerting any influence on mental-activity in the normal state, wholly autonomous and separated from the general mass of experience by an impassable barrier.

I, personally, incline very strongly to the former view with which I suspect that most psychologists would agree; but support of the other view, or of something closely resembling it, is not lacking from authoritative quarters.

This is the sort of point which might, in my opinion, be elucidated by the method which I have here described and in some measure tested. If it be conceded as a result of these experiments that it is possible to obtain a characteristic chart, so to speak, or at least to achieve a representative sampling, of a subject's mind by such means, it should be possible, in the light of this knowledge, to investigate the problem experimentally.

Consider a well-marked case of double personality in which the subject shows two alternative states 'A' and 'B' of which we will suppose that A is the normal, or relatively normal, state. If we test the subject in the A state on ten occasions, say, we shall obtain, if we use a reasonably large list of words, a set of mean reactions characteristic of the mental content determining that state. A similar testing of the B state will give us a set of reactions characteristic of the mental content of *that* state. If the correlation of these two sets of mean reactions proves to be of the same order as the correlation of an individual with himself—*i.e.* of the order of +.65—we may conclude that the mental contents corresponding to and respectively determining the two states are essentially the same. But if the correlation is of the same order as that given by two different individuals—*i.e.* of the order of +.1 or +.2—we may conclude that the determining mental contents are different. To adopt the familiar, but valuable, analogy of the 'iceberg,' we should conclude in the first case that it is the same iceberg, but with a different area above the water and, in the second, that the iceberg has really been split into two parts.

As I have said, I anticipate that the former view would prove correct and this is to some extent supported by the work of Prince and Peterson in the "Sally Beauchamp" case described in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* for 1908.

These experimenters found that words which were emotionally signifi-

cant to the patient in one state evoked a large psycho-galvanic reflex when presented to her in another, in spite of the fact that when in the latter state she was amnesic to the experiences which, in her first state, invested the words with their significance. The experiments were however few in number and of a relatively rough-and-ready nature. That is to say no attempt was made to show the agreement between the two states *quantitatively* and, even if this had been done, there was in existence no standard of comparison by which the extent of the agreement could be assessed.

Unfortunately such clear-cut cases as this are rare, unless we include, as I think we should, those trance conditions commonly known as 'mediumistic.' These seem to me to deserve more attention from abnormal psychologists (and less from spiritualists) than they have yet received. To investigate such cases by the method described above would be very interesting and would almost certainly exhibit the trance 'controls'—to use the technical term—as no more than secondary personalities of the 'mediums' concerned.

It would also be exceedingly interesting to apply the method to hypnotic subjects. Hypnosis is now believed by many authorities to depend essentially on an affective attitude of mind on the part of the subject towards the physician and it is at least possible that this might show itself in the reactions given by subjects who have been frequently hypnotised when compared with those who have not.

It is also possible that the reactions of a subject under hypnosis would differ appreciably from those of the same subject in his normal state, and if this were so we might obtain interesting light on the mental condition of a hypnotised subject.

It would also be interesting to ascertain whether it would be possible to abolish or to enhance the affective tone normally evoked by a stimulus word by suggesting to the hypnotised subject that he should feel no emotion, or a great deal—as the case might be—when the word in question is called out.

Another point worth investigating would be the question of whether one could bring about any considerable redistribution of affective tone among the words of the list by suggesting to the subject that he is some person other than himself. It is well known that a hypnotised subject in a suitable condition will impersonate a suggested character with a fidelity and histrionic skill which are often remarkable. It would be interesting to ascertain whether such a suggested impersonation were accompanied by any radical redistribution of affective tone of anything

like the same order as would necessarily be observed if the real individual impersonated were substituted for the hypnotised subject. Personally I do not anticipate that any such wholesale redistribution would take place, but some appreciable change is at least possible and, in any event, the question of the extent to which 'affect' can be displaced and redistributed by suggestion is a very interesting one, the answer to which would considerably enlarge our understanding of mental mechanisms and processes.

The foregoing may be summarised as follows:

(i) Individuals show marked and characteristic differences in the reactions they give to a suitably selected list of words.

(ii) Provided the mean values of several tests are taken and that these tests do not extend over too long a period individuals correlate with themselves much more highly than they do with each other.

(iii) The most probable values of the correlations of individuals with themselves and with each other may be taken as approximately $+ .65$ and $+ .15$ respectively, for a list of words of the kind here used. More extensive investigations could, if necessary, enable us to fix these values precisely, to determine the corresponding frequency distributions and thus to render future problems dealt with on these lines amenable to strict mathematical treatment.

(iv) These facts should enable us to determine whether certain tracts of experience ever become completely split off from the principal mass, and whether mental conditions which appear at first sight to differ *toto coelo* from each other are in reality determined by identically the same aggregate of experiences of which different aspects are thus expressed, or whether they proceed from aggregates so discrete and so independent of one another as to warrant our describing the resultant states as genuinely different personalities. They may also throw considerable light on various questions concerning the permanence and liability to disturbance of the affective tone concomitant to the experiences of an individual mind.

REVIEWS.

The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family. By J. C. FLÜGEL, B.A. The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1921. pp. x + 259. 10s. 6d. net.

In everyone who takes up the study of Psycho-Analysis strong resistance is at first invariably aroused by Freud's account of the part played by the Œdipus complex in the production of the psycho-neuroses and in determining throughout life the character and conduct of those who remain more or less free from neurotic disabilities. By some this resistance is never overcome and it serves as an effective barrier against any true understanding of psycho-analytic teaching. On the other hand no one who has occasion to enter upon the active *practice* of psycho-analysis can fail to be impressed by the evidence afforded of the importance of the affective relations subsisting between the patient and the various members of his family. But having thus verified the truth of some part of Freud's teaching and become therefore more ready to believe that other parts which he has not yet verified may also be true, the student finds himself confronted with a whole system of beliefs which may come into violent conflict with all he has hitherto held most dear.

In no direction is this opposition between traditional ideals and the findings of psycho-analysis more marked and insistent than in that towards which we have to turn in the psycho-analytic study of the family; and although many of the conclusions to be derived from such study have already been given expression to in the works of Freud and of other psycho-analysts, the time is ripe for bringing them together and dealing with them systematically as Mr Flügel has done in this book. It is true that the results of recent research are still largely a matter of controversy, and it is not to be expected that any finality of view can be attained at the present time; but the practical importance of the conclusions already arrived at—some of them supported by evidence drawn from many different sources—justifies the attempt to show the bearings which these conclusions have on the actual conduct of social and family life.

For the most part this book aims at being a work of compilation and the author thinks it necessary to warn the reader that, except in the last few chapters, he will find nothing here that has not already found a place in the literature dealing with the subject. On the whole this is perhaps true, but we think Mr Flügel is too modest in his estimation of the value of his own contributions and of the usefulness of the book as a whole, not only to the psychologist but to "the sociologist, the moralist, the spiritual adviser, the teacher, the family physician and the parent."

In the order of presentation adopted the primitive emotions in relation to the family and the origin of the conflict arising out of them are first set forth. Then follows an interesting chapter on "The Family and the Life Task of the Individual," in which full credit is given to Jung's views, although there is also some cogent criticism of this writer's denial of "all ultimate significance to the sexual aspects of the family complexes." Mr Flügel's own view is that the sexual aspects of the ideas connected with the Œdipus complex "possess more than a mere symbolic significance—that they must in fact be looked upon

as, for the most part, actually being that which they appear to be, *i.e.* manifestations of (relatively) infantile tendencies which, as regards their nature and origin, are continuous with, and comparable to, the fully developed sexual tendencies of adult life."

He makes, however, a distinction between the 'sexual' and the 'dependence' aspects of the family relationship, although he admits that in actual life these are inextricably interwoven. Normal development entails emergence from parental authority and care and the attainment of autonomy in judgment and conduct. Development in these respects seems as difficult as in the case of the sexual tendencies, and, when obstacles and difficulties are encountered, is liable to arrest, retardation and regression to earlier stages, just as in the case of *libido* development.

The abnormalities and varieties of development in respect of the love and hate elements of the Œdipus complex and the influence of the fixation of these on the growth of the dependence aspects are well described. An outline of "The Psychology of Initiation and Initiation Rites" is followed by two interesting chapters on "The Development of Parent Substitutes" and "Family Influences in the Development of the Love Life." In the latter chapter Freud's division of loves into two types—the narcissistic type and the dependence type—is adopted and an instructive account of the implications of this division is given. Noteworthy also is the detailed consideration of the factors tending towards the production of dissociation of purely sexual attraction from tenderness, esteem and the other components of fully developed love.

Problems of great sociological importance are discussed in Chapter XII on "Family Influences in Social Development." The displacement of mother-regarding and father-regarding tendencies on to the state is illustrated by the different attitudes towards their native land shown by Englishmen and Germans, for example, and this difference suggests to Mr Flügel "the existence of a fairly close correspondence on the one hand between the maternal view of the state and the development of democratic institutions and individual independence, and on the other hand between the paternal view and the development and retention of autocracy and a relatively strict subordination of the individual to the authority of the government and of its representatives" (p. 128).

When the attitude towards the state is not one of love but one of hate and rebellion, hostility towards the parent is held to play the leading part in the unconscious motivation of malcontents and revolutionaries. It is for this reason, Mr Flügel says, that revolutions in autocratic paternal states are usually more violent and extreme than in the case of freer and more liberal maternal countries—"since the desire for rebellion in early family life is generally directed against the authority of the father to a much greater extent than against that of the mother." But rebellion against the mother is a common feature in the family life of the female half of the population, and, if Mr Flügel's view is correct, it is interesting to speculate on the probable effect on future revolutions of the recent accession of women to political power.

The descriptive portion of the book concludes with chapters on "Family Influences in Religion" and "The Attitude of Parents to Children." This latter chapter is one of the most useful and valuable of the whole book, for, as Mr Flügel says, "The avoidance of the evils consequent upon the insufficient readjustment of the parents' attitude towards their children is one of the most pressing tasks of an enlightened hygiene of family life."

In the more theoretical portion of his book Mr Flügel attempts to establish

some connections between the psychological data and the related facts of anthropology and biology. The origin and development of the love and hate aspects of the family tendencies are dealt with in some detail; but since the hate tendencies arise very largely from thwartings of the love tendencies, the latter are fundamentally the more important and receive from the author the more searching examination.

From the standpoint of psycho-analysis the love aspects of the family tendencies centre in the problem of incestuous affection, and Mr Flügel discusses this problem, asking (1) What are the influences which bring about this attachment in the human mind, and (2) what are the further influences which have brought about its repression?

Very full consideration is given to all the factors which may have been operative in producing and maintaining the tendency to incest; but in view of the universal occurrence of this tendency and of its great strength even after ages of repression, Mr Flügel is tempted to regard it as an innate factor in man's mental constitution. Indeed he supposes that at one time this tendency may have been of advantage in the struggle for existence and that its persistence to-day may be due to a consolidation of hereditary dispositions effected by natural selection.

When he comes to consider the question of the repression of incestuous love Mr Flügel finds, as was not the case in his discussion of the positive aspects of the tendency, that certain explanations have already been advanced by other writers; but these he considers for the most part unsatisfactory or at least incomplete. He passes in review the explanations of exogamy given by primitive peoples themselves and by such writers as Durkheim, Westermarck, Wundt, McLennan, Herbert Spencer and others; and although he admits that the factors suggested by these authorities may have played some part in bringing about the practice of exogamy, he thinks there is pretty general agreement that none of them affords a complete or sufficient account of this phase of racial development.

In pointing out the "biological absurdity" of parent-child incest (p. 207) Mr Flügel raises some doubts in our minds concerning his suggestion, referred to above, that the tendency to incest is perhaps innate and was at one time fostered by natural selection. For now he describes the dysgenic effects on the offspring which result from cohabitation between individuals of widely different ages, and the disadvantages which would accrue to any races in which parent-child unions were common. Natural selection would act adversely to the inheritance of such tendencies; and although this objection would not apply to brother-sister unions, yet these are admittedly not the most primitive form of incest, and, on Mr Flügel's own showing, it is therefore difficult to see how natural selection in our *human* ancestors can account for the universal presence of the incestuous tendencies revealed in the *Œdipus* complex. Their innateness, if they are innate, must be traced to an earlier phase of phyletic history.

On the other hand there is every reason to believe that the tendency to the repression of incest is innate in man, and, as Mr Flügel well shows, such repression would have survival value in primitive peoples and would thus allow natural selection to come into play in forming and consolidating the hereditary dispositions which ensure the repression of the *Œdipus* complex. For as he points out, strong family ties conflict with individual and social development and natural selection would "ensure the continuation of those communities in which the incest tendencies were more repressed" (p. 211).

The book concludes with two valuable chapters on the "Ethical and Practical Application" of the knowledge to be derived from the psycho-analytic study of the family. The two chief tasks revealed by this study are (1) "the weaning of the child from the incestuous love which binds it to the family (together with the secondary hatred which this love may entail), and (2) the gradual loosening of the psychological, moral and economic dependence of the individual on the family."

Considerations of space forbid us to enter into any detailed examination of the many important contributions which Mr Flügel has made to the matters discussed in this book; we can only recommend their careful study to everyone who is interested in the psychological and sociological problems of to-day.

T. W. MITCHELL.

Psychoanalysis in the Classroom. By GEORGE H. GREEN. London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1921. pp. viii + 276. 7s. 6d. net.

The writer of this little volume has endeavoured to "present as clearly and as simply as possible, such parts of the psychoanalytic theory as were likely to be of use to parents and teachers." He has succeeded admirably.

The title is perhaps open to some small objection. "Psychoanalysis" is less euphonious than the more generally accepted term; and, further, Mr Green does not for a moment desire, as his title might suggest, that the teacher himself should carry out psycho-analysis upon the pupils in his classroom: he merely feels that an appreciation of recent psycho-analytic doctrines will assist the teacher to understand the nature, or at least to recognise the existence, of many of the commoner problems which the classroom presents.

His exposition starts from the daydream. In so doing he abandons the order followed by most writers, who begin, as a rule, with nocturnal dreams, or with myths and the symptoms of hysterical delusions. Instead, he chooses an approach which is far more familiar, far more intelligible, and far more acceptable, to the lay reader. From the daydream, which he analyses at considerable length, he turns to discuss the nature of play, which is itself to a large extent an acted daydream, just as the daydream is a passive form of imaginative play. Only after these simpler topics does he advance to an exposition of the process of nocturnal dreaming. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that he nowhere attempts to summarise the more important of the recognised mechanisms that underlie the processes of dream-formation; for an understanding of these mechanisms would throw a flood of light upon the allied activities of fantasy and play, and upon classroom problems generally.

A couple of chapters follow upon "word-associations" and on "interest," leading up to the doctrine of "libido," which is conceived, apparently, as a sort of general fund of mental energy, a fundamental conative impulse which becomes specialised into the several hereditary instincts. The three processes of introversion, extroversion, and identification, are then discussed in as many chapters, rather from the standpoint of Jung; and the psychopathology of everyday life is then expounded from the familiar standpoint of Freud. The book closes with a cautious chapter upon "dependence and sex."

A bibliography is appended. Tridon's *Psychoanalysis* is described, with an excess of generosity, as "the best single volume available for the reader who

is not acquainted with the technical side"—a commendation that would be more worthily attached to Mr Green's own chapters. Dr Tansley's *New Psychology*, however, and Professor Nunn's *Education: Its Data and First Principles* are omitted from his list: they would provide the teacher with a far sounder approach to the problems Mr Green has in mind. But, for the most part, both the selection, and summaries of the several books selected (which would have gained by an indication of their size and price) are trustworthy, and likely to be most helpful to beginners.

Throughout Mr Green has written in a clear and interesting manner; and the more important points are well illustrated by the analysis, or at least the description, of some fourteen representative cases. I know of no other introduction to psycho-analysis, equally simple in its approach, equally popular in style, and equally cheap in cost, which can be so safely recommended not only to the teacher or student of education, but also to the school medical officer who has at times to deal with problems of child character and of the classroom. The doctrines of the two schools of Zürich and of Vienna are absorbed into the discussion with almost complete impartiality. The author acknowledges the personal assistance of Oxford psychologists—Professor McDougall, Dr Keatinge, and Dr Marett; and their views have plainly influenced his general attitude. If his treatment is a little lacking in profundity, in originality, and in systematic thoroughness, this, as the author explains, is due to a deliberate limitation in his initial purpose.

CYRIL BURT.

The Education of Behaviour: A Psychological Study. By I. B. SAXBY, D.Sc.
London: The University of London Press, Ltd., 1921. pp. viii + 248.
6s. net.

This book is a lucid and readable attempt to describe for teachers and parents the modern views upon the psychology of character, and to deduce from those views a body of practical precepts for character-training. The basis of the general exposition is McDougall's doctrine of human instincts, as set forth in his *Social Psychology*; but the writer also incorporates into her pages a good deal of other recent and experimental work.

One or two minor points call perhaps for a little criticism. Dr Saxby is writing primarily "for those who are in charge of boys or girls during adolescence," by which period she seems to understand the ages between nine and seventeen. But of the peculiar difficulties of adolescence, as commonly recognised, she says little or nothing; and the bibliography does not even include Stanley Hall's classical work upon the subject. There is, it is true, a brief section upon the sex instinct; or, as the writer prefers to name it, the "impulse to seek a mate." But her account consists chiefly of cautious platitudes about the microscopic amoeba and the duty of sex-enlightenment.

It is claimed in the publishers' announcement that "the author includes psychanalysis in a very effective way, especially in its direct application to the everyday work of education." The book, however, makes practically no attempt to give a full and systematic account of the characteristic psycho-analytic doctrines; and the summary of the views of Freud and Jung is limited to three or four pages each on "repressed complexes," on "mind tunnelling by free association," and on "hero-worship."

In its general character the book is somewhat uneven. But it represents a sincere endeavour to carry out a useful and much needed piece of work. The analytic summaries at the head of each chapter will be especially helpful to the student: and the bibliography at the close (which, with the index, curiously enough omits all reference to Stout) should be of service to those who wish to fill in the outlines which Miss Saxby has so clearly sketched.

CYRIL BURT.

The Psychology of Everyday Life. By JAMES DREVER, M.A., B.Sc., D.Phil., Combe Lecturer in Psychology in the University of Edinburgh. London: Methuen & Co., 1921. pp. ix + 164. 6s. net.

The avowed object of the author is to satisfy the reasonable desire of the ordinary educated man for a closer acquaintance with the science of modern psychology. He claims that "the topics which have been selected for treatment represent at one and the same time the essential elements of the science and those sections of it more particularly which have a close relation to practical life, and which in recent times have come prominently into notice in connexion with various developments in medicine, education and industry." The "modern" psychology of the author is not the "new" psychology of the psycho-analyst, but includes it. He "has striven to preserve a due balance of treatment in the science as a whole, and, taking the longer view, is convinced that psychology is far wider than the theory of Freud or Jung, and that those psychologists themselves would be the first to acknowledge the fact" (vi).

After two introductory chapters, starting from the position that "man is primarily a doer rather than a knower" (19), he shows that the "urge" or "drive" of instinct, with its accompanying emotion, will account for much of the activity of mankind, by treatment of that portion of psychology which is most akin to biology: appetites and instincts; emotion, mood and sentiment; social interaction—imitation, sympathy and suggestion; play, relaxation and mirth; defence mechanisms—self sophistication, compensation, protective camouflage and forgetting. This brings us to the centre of the book and is followed by four chapters dealing with the work of the older "new" psychology, in which the methods and apparatus of the physicist have been applied to the study of sensation, perception and memory. "Jung's association method" and "Freud's psycho-analysis" are dealt with briefly in the chapter on memory and forgetting. The author agrees that forgetting is often due to submerged complexes but is not prepared to accept the Freudian theory as to the nature of these complexes; and, in contradiction to the extreme Freudian position that "all forgetting is repression," holds that "As causes of forgetfulness we have these three, selection and interference, which operate partly through inhibition and dissociation, and obliviscence, the result of lapse of time" (117).

We have then a short chapter on imagining and thinking, "devoted largely to defining and distinguishing," and only one page of which deals with thought. Dr Drever recognises that in these processes we are dealing with "higher mental levels" (123), and concludes his short treatment of thinking with the words: "The thinking of relations thus enables us to have that kind of experience called a concept, and to go on to deal with concepts, independently of the particular and the concrete, to go on, it may be, to the discovery of laws and

principles which are universal. This development of mind seems to be reached by the human being alone to any significant extent" (131). That the author can spare no more than ten pages for "mental elements that are characteristic of the higher mental levels" that are "reached by the human being alone" would seem to indicate that, in an attempt to escape the errors of a too intellectual psychology, he has swung to the opposite extreme. We look in vain for any treatment of reason, judgment, knowledge, belief or volition; while the treatment of character, to be found in the first part of the book, is hopelessly inadequate. As Ward, paraphrasing Kant, writes: "Character is not a question of what nature (his talent and temperament) makes of the man, but of what the man makes of himself. Talent may give him a market-value in respect of the services he can render; temperament may give him an affection-value as a congenial and pleasant comrade; but character gives him (or may give him) an inner worth that is beyond all price¹."

The book concludes with two chapters on abnormal psychology containing accounts of illusion, delusion, hallucination, dreams, crystal vision, automatic writing, and multiple personality. The last three are termed "spiritistic phenomena" and are used to bolster up a tilt at psychical research and those scientists who have been associated with it. The author's dislike of "psychical research in its spiritistic guise" (2) looms large in the book. We meet it in the introduction; in the chapter on perception, after a discussion of "the conjuror's success" and reference to experimental demonstration of the unreliability of evidence, we read: "In the light of such demonstrations, the evidence of the great majority of the witnesses of spiritistic manifestations, however honest and sincere they may be, must be regarded as utterly worthless" (79); the book concludes with the words: "He would be a bold man who would attempt to define the limits of the possible, but the limits of the probable are easily determined by any intelligent man who is willing to acquaint himself with the relevant evidence, and to consider that evidence without personal bias or prejudice"; while a little earlier we are informed: "The psychologist claims that, if he has not solved all the problems, he is at least in a fair way towards solution" (152). Need it be said that this extreme view is not the reasoned finding of psychology? Scarcely, we think, when Professor McDougall (whom the author places first in the list of psychologists to whom he "would acknowledge particular indebtedness") (vii), in his *Home University volume on Psychology*, gives F. W. H. Myers' *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death* and Sir W. F. Barrett's *Psychical Research* in the list of six books on the abnormal included in the bibliography for the general reader.

This attitude towards psychical research would seem to be bound up with the author's attitude towards the question of the reality of mind. "The science which studies the mind...is not a satisfactory description of the province of psychology" (2) because "mind is not an observed fact" (3). Nevertheless the writer is not a thorough-going behaviourist: he does not finally discard mind. We find memory described as a "definite change in the structure of the nervous system, and of the mind" (16), and dissociation as "a definite blocking of...connecting paths in the nervous system—and in the mind" (35). Still in each case the inclusion of mind appears to be due to an afterthought and in no way essential to the argument. When we seek the author's meaning of mind we find the following: "Further, experience, regarded as a phase in

¹ *Psychological Principles*, p. 461.

reaction to an environment, is a quite unique product of the life forces of the organism on the one side and the nature of the environment on the other.... It is a compound product, or a synthetic product, to use chemical terminology, but a compound in which the life forces and the external environment take on the new character of mind" (13). From which it would seem that for the author, either, mind is epiphenomenal, or, experience *is* mind, even as James argued "the thoughts themselves are the thinkers."

Lip service is given to introspection: "Introspection must be regarded as the final court of appeal in psychology" (7): "the science which studies behaviour will not be psychology except in so far as it regards behaviour as in some way the outcome of mental or psychical process" (3). The substitution of 'mental process' for 'mind' would seem to betoken a compromise, for while mind is rejected as not an observed fact, an attempt is made to find some place for "mental and psychical facts" in a definition of psychology. It is suggested that the definitions of the introspectionist and behaviourist schools of thought must be combined to secure a satisfactory definition. "The truth is psychology studies the two groups of related facts, the facts of experience and the facts of behaviour. The objective happenings are those activities which constitute the behaviour of a living organism, but those objective happenings are interpreted in the light of that inside knowledge of the underlying mental processes or happenings, which each individual has direct access to in his own experience" (3). This would seem to indicate that the fundamental methods of psychology necessarily involve the "psychologist's fallacy" and will satisfy neither party in the dispute. The position is readily demolished by the thorough-going behaviourist. He has no need to interpret behaviour in terms of experience. He assumes ability to use intelligence and reason, and these suffice for the building up of suitable hypotheses in explanation of his "observed facts." In common with workers in other sciences he is not concerned with introspection. On the other hand the introspectionist will declare that the object of his introspection is not primarily the interpretation of behaviour, but the observation of his own mental processes, in order that he may compare them with similar observations of others and seek, by that same use of the intelligence and reason on which the behaviourist and others rely, to evolve hypotheses explanatory of mental phenomena.

The given reason for rejecting mind from a definition of psychology is that "mind is not an observed fact." We are then at once faced with the question—What is an observed fact? Is 'mind' in any worse position than 'light' or 'electricity'; or is the existence of 'matter,' the fundamental assumption in the science of chemistry, any more a demonstrable fact than the existence of 'mind,' the fundamental assumption of the 'old' psychology? The final word in the battle between realist and idealist has yet to be written. Without awaiting it, on the assumption of the reality of matter, other sciences, "daughters of philosophy and elder sisters of psychology" (2), have built up much valuable knowledge. Possibly psychology, as a science, must similarly make an initial assumption of the reality of mind, believing that mind is for the psychologist what matter is for the chemist. Two other possibilities seem open. We may class 'mind' with 'sound,' 'light,' 'heat,' 'magnetism' and 'electricity,' believing that finally it will be explained in terms of matter and motion, or, we may hand 'mind' back to philosophy, as for science, a useless concept. The first of these positions would seem to be that of the behaviourist: the second that of our author.

We freely acknowledge the great value of the work of the behaviourist and quasi-behaviourist, but their activities are so engrossing that they have little or no time for the psychology which has absorbed much of the time of many of the world's greatest thinkers and must perforce leave untouched an important part of the field of psychology: the "higher mental levels" which can be studied in man only and apparently by no other means than introspection and the comparison of records of introspection. In discussing the formation of character, Ward writes: "Whereas the mere animal practically begins and ends with the stability of its instincts—is from first to last confined to the level of its species—man only gradually achieves personal stability in passing from that level through the instability of the imagining and desiring self of childhood to the steadfastness of a reasonable and autonomous being. But it is notorious that there are many who never, completely and all round, develop beyond the larval stage, are never altogether 'grown up'; but in one respect or in many behave like children all their days. Ribot calls such people *les instables ou polymorphes*; he even regards them as more or less morbid cases of arrested development or *infantilisme psychologique*." Modern psychology, on the showing of our author, would seem to be the psychology of the instinctive levels and of the imagining and desiring self of the child and polymorph. He has done good work in showing the "new" psychology as but a section of "modern" psychology. It remains for "modern" psychology to realise that it, also, is a part, not the whole.

R. J. BARTLETT.

The Psychology of Industry. By JAMES DREVER, M.A., B.Sc., D.Phil., Combe Lecturer in Psychology in the University of Edinburgh. London: Methuen & Co., 1921. pp. xi + 148. 5s. net.

The author has written "not so much for the student of psychology as for the ordinary man" (p. v) a concise and interesting summary of the application of experimental psychology to industry, from which may be gathered both the value and limitations of "the applied psychology of industry" (p. 127). Case after case is quoted where output has been more than doubled while the quality of work has improved; but an antagonistic attitude of the workman will more than neutralise the best work of the "new profession... of 'psychologist'" (p. 40). "Gilbreth's well-known bricklaying experiment" proved that it was readily possible "to lay 350 bricks per hour, in place of the 120 which represented the normal hour's work on the old method. In this country [Scotland] the present *day's* work of the bricklayer is 300 bricks!" (p. 84). The industrial psychologist had ideal conditions under which to work during the war, for then "the spirit in many factories was the spirit of the football field" (p. 52), but apart from that time, when a common cause banded all together to increase efficiency as much as possible "there has hitherto been a tendency on the part of the worker to regard the intervention of the psychologist with suspicion" (p. 41).

"Psychological problems of the economic life arrange themselves in three well-marked groups: (1) Problems of the worker—his character, intelligence, vocational fitness and the like; (2) Problems of the work, and the factors upon

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 464–5.

which its efficiency depends, such as fatigue, length of work and rest periods, economy of movement, conditions of working, and the like; (3) Problems of the market" (p. 8). Under (1) are described intelligence and vocational tests (chs. II, III), under (2) laboratory experiments on work and fatigue, analysis of the work curve and application of the results to industrial conditions with the object of improving both output and quality of work (chs. V-IX), while under (3) are considered advertisement, display and salesmanship (chs. X, XI).

In the field of work, and to some extent in vocational tests also, it is difficult to separate the work of psychologist from that of physiologist. The "oft quoted" vocational test for bicycle ball examiners (p. 38) secures the reaction time for a visual stimulus by methods well within the realm of physiology.

The author also finds it necessary, and not particularly easy, to discriminate between industrial psychology and economics. He writes: "Marshall defines economics as 'a study of man's actions in the ordinary business of life.' This is curious and interesting, because it is precisely how a behaviourist might define human psychology, and the fact would seem to indicate how closely the two sciences may come to each other when we consider the relation of both to ordinary life" (p. 6). He considers the difference between them is "that economics is really an abstract science" whilst psychology studies "the concrete activities of the concrete individuals": economics is concerned with the average man, psychology with individual men. He refers to Ruskin's attacks on economics. Maybe the industrial psychologist, too, has need to remember that man appears to be more than a machine. It is noticeable that the first of the "problems of the worker" recognised by the author, *character*, is passed over with a casual reference, while the other factors, intelligence and vocational fitness, are given a chapter each.

"Industrial psychology" must be distinguished from "scientific management" (p. 9). "Psychology must not be made in any way responsible for some of that 'speeding up' and over-driving in industry, which various scientific management engineers have falsely attributed to psychology" (p. 50). Unfortunately, however, unscrupulous management, in normal times, may attempt to turn, solely to its own profit and that of capital, possibilities of labour revealed by the psychologist when called in, at an abnormal time, to assist in accomplishing abnormal tasks. It is this that labour fears and feels it must resist. Again, apart from the fear of unfair treatment, there are questions that arise directly from the nature of the results obtained by the psychologist. "Where 140 men can do the work formerly requiring 500, what is to happen to the other 360?" (p. 75). Labour fears increased efficiency in the human machine just as it feared, and to some extent still fears, the introduction of machinery, believing that increased efficiency must be accompanied by an increase in the number of unemployed. "You must convince the worker that he individually will not be the loser, and the trade union that its solidarity will not be imperilled" (p. 76). A psychology that deals with man primarily as a 'doer,' rather than as a 'thinker' and 'believer,' can do little to produce that desirable conviction.

While, however, the author is concerned primarily with the application of the older 'new' psychology to industry he seems uneasy in his self-imposed shackles and from time to time takes the broader outlook of an older psychology. "The worker's belief" (p. 52) obtrudes itself from time to time; the influence of "an effort of will" (p. 64) is recognised in the work problem, while

"the will to buy" (p. 110) is the crux of the difficulty in the discussion of problems of the market, and plays such tricks with applied psychology that the author is constrained to write: "A knowledge of general human psychology is probably even more important in business than a knowledge of the applied psychology of salesmanship and advertising" (p. 105); and again: "The psychology of salesmanship is in fact very largely a direct application of the principles of general psychology, not a highly specialised branch like industrial psychology" (p. 125). It would seem that the industrial psychologist, as many another industrial scientist, is but a tool in the hands of a controlling management that knows what it wants and wills to secure it. Among the leaders in that controlling management are men, brought up on classics and the humanities, who know little of science but much of human nature, and who, maybe as pastime, have read and enjoyed Ward's *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article on Psychology, absorbing therefrom some of those principles of general psychology that our author agrees are so valuable in the management of men. It is the old story of the 'doer' doing the will of the 'knower.'

In the introduction and conclusion we find material for a preliminary classification of the branches of psychology. "The real new psychology" is an *applied* psychology having at present at least three clearly differentiated sections: applied psychology of medicine, applied psychology of industry and applied psychology of education (p. 127). Applied science presupposes a 'pure' science and accordingly in addition to, or possibly including, the 'general psychology' already referred to we are, in passing, introduced to a "Pure psychology [that] seeks to understand...behaviour...by understanding...mental processes" (p. 5). To secure a satisfactory definition of this pure psychology is apparently an aim of the author. The attempt made, in *The Psychology of Everyday Life*, to combine the 'old' and 'new' definitions is carried a step further. The definition now put forward to replace the 'old' definition—"The science of the mind or soul"—is: "The science of the facts of human nature and human behaviour" (p. 4). Remembering that elsewhere the author has written: "science, if it has done nothing else, has at least made us critical of definitions¹," we would criticise. The inclusion of the word 'facts' in the definition of a science would seem to be an innovation, of doubtful value, challenging the question—What are 'facts'? Again—What is 'human nature'? In what respects is it superior to 'mind' in a definition of psychology? And lastly, we are greatly surprised that our author, whose best known work in psychology is work on instinct, should restrict the province of psychology by inserting the word 'human.'

R. J. BARTLETT

Symptomatology, Psychognosis, and Diagnosis of Psychopathic Diseases. By BORIS SIDIS, A.M., Ph.D., M.D. Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingstone, 1921. pp. xix + 448. 21s.

This is apparently the reproduction of a work published originally some years ago in America. The name of Boris Sidis is well known in connection with hypnoidal states and the method of mental exploration which he calls psychognosis, and when he describes this we recognise the writing of a practised

¹ *Psychology of Everyday Life*, p. 2.

clinician; but the rest of the book presents an embarrassing wealth of material that cries aloud for criticism. In his introduction he lays down that

"the phenomena of abnormal mental life do not present any purpose in the present; they are repetitions, recurrences of a past, but they have no aim, no purpose, no meaning in the present life existence of the patient. In fact, the symptoms are pathological, just because they have no purpose, no meaning in the life of the patient" (p. viii).

Dr Sidis evidently attaches value to literary repetition, but the memory of these phrases raises wonder why

"we must learn to know the working of the patient's mind, we must learn his ideals of life, his attitude towards man and the world, his actions and his total reactions in his adaptations to his environment" (p. xviii).

One suspects that his antagonism towards certain views often leads the author to express opinions which, like those first quoted, are not consistent with his own practice. Psycho-analysis he attacks by the method of vituperation and, after concluding that "Psycho-analysis is sheer humbug," he modestly says of Psychognosis:

"All I wish to convey by it is what the term means, namely a study, an acquisition of a working knowledge of the patient's soul, so to say" (p. xvii).

A fourth part of the book is devoted to illusions and hallucinations, and four and a half pages suffice for the consideration of "fixed ideas, morbid impulses, and emotions"; this is a badly balanced distribution. A chapter on delusions opens with the thought-provoking remark that "delusions do not belong to the domain of functional psychology." Such bald statements abound, but are sometimes more intelligible than this one; in fact, they are often primitive in their simplicity. Simple is his classification of nervous and mental diseases: first come *organopathies* or *necropathies*, in which there is a pathological modification of the nerve cell ending in the death of the neuron; these include general paresis and dementia precox. Then come *neuropathies*,

"in which the neuron undergoes degenerative changes which at first bring about an apparent increase and then a suspension of function not necessarily terminating in the death of the neuron... Here belong all the temporary maniacal, melancholic and delusional states... and, in general, all the mental states known at present under the description of manic-depressive insanity" (p. 97).

These states may or may not be due to degenerative changes in the neuron, but the unsuspecting reader would believe that such changes are common-places of pathological anatomy instead of a matter of speculation.

The pathology of what are commonly known as 'functional nervous disorders' is equally simple. In these, which he calls *psychopathies*,

"the neuron itself may remain healthy, the trouble being due to associations with systems of neurons which are usually not called into action by the function of that particular neuron or system of neurons" (p. 98).

A little further on we find reference to hysterical disturbances of various organs

"over the functions of which the personal consciousness is found on examination to have lost control by reason of neuron disaggregation and dissociation" (p. 100).

The method of examination leading to such a discovery ought to be definitely described, for the result obtained should throw a great light upon the age-long problem of the relation of brain and mind. And it all seems so simple.

Unfortunately the simplicity is not maintained. In a chapter on the aphasias he talks of "a lesion of the temporo-sphenoidal convolution" causing *auditory apraxia* (p. 251); then the next paragraph begins "Systems of tactual presentations may similarly become disaggregated" and he goes on to talk about—one cannot say 'describe'—other disaggregations causing *alexia*, *apraxia*, etc. On p. 255 he returns to "a lesion of such extent as to prevent the associative activity of all the special sense areas," and finishes the chapter with—

"The forms of reviewed aphasias may be of an organic nature, or of a functional psychopathic character which may closely simulate organic conditions."

He leaves out the question of differential diagnosis, and is certainly wise not to try to extricate himself or his readers from this tangle of highly speculative 'neuron disaggregation' and observed pathological facts. 'Neuron disaggregation' is a plain statement of supposed fact that has, however, no basis in actual observation and only confuses discussion. If it had the slightest use in helping us to understand cases, or in helping the author to describe them, one might endure it for its pragmatic value; but when the author comes to describe clinical work all this speculation is discarded and we hear no more about neurons or their disaggregation.

A similar objection applies to the classification of the energy of the neuron as dynamic, static, reserve and organic; it is a presumption that leads nowhere, except to the production of a diagram that has served the reviewer to while away some of his Christmas holiday in an unsuccessful attempt to understand it. The five-page chapter on "The Diagnosis of Psychopathic States" provides a sort of 'find the missing picture' puzzle. Under this caption we expect to find information of clinical value in diagnosis, but expect in vain. We try to imagine some possible condition to which the wordy descriptions can apply, for example:

"Another important characteristic is the *periodicity* of remissions in the appearance of the morbid system. The attacks of functioning of the dissociated morbid system run in cycles. During the attack the mind works in a circle. This is an important pathognomonic symptom of psychopathic affected: *cyclical* and *circular* mental movements" (p. 391).

We are given no hint as to the clinical nature of the 'morbid system,' or of the 'attacks,' and as the 'psychopathic affected' gives us a range over all the functional nervous disorders the value of the 'pathognomonic symptom' lies chiefly in its power of provoking curiosity. Does Dr Sidis here refer to hysterical seizures, to the exacerbations that sometimes recur in anxiety states, or to those 'nervous breakdowns' that occur several times in the course of years and prove to be exaggerations of an obsessional neurosis?

Dr Sidis has many selves: one of them says (p. 269):

"Nothing so much impresses itself upon the mind and is remembered so lastingly as some extremely painful experience.... Experiments performed on the oblivescence of the painful tend to prove that it is the painful that remains for a long time specially vivid in consciousness."

Another, his psychognostic self, writes chapters describing the process of restoring to consciousness unpleasant and horrible memories, and, having thus disposed of the beliefs of the first self, declares:

"Unless this nucleus of the set of subconscious symptoms is reached and disintegrated the patient cannot be regarded as cured" (p. 380).

To this another self counters:

"Many psychopathic cases have been treated by me and cured *permanently* [author's italics] by hypnosis alone" (p. 70).

Yet there is no apparent result of conflict: Dr Sidis has no doubts; what he believes is final; and one pictures in him, as a natural gift, that cheery and confident manner which medical text-books tell us is so important in the successful psychotherapist. The Great War and the hand of Time have dealt lightly with his views, and what he wrote in 1914 he reproduces unchanged in 1921.

It must not be thought that the author is incapable of making sound observations. His work on hypnosis has practical value for those who use the method either for suggestion or mental exploration, and he was, after Freud and Breuer, a leader in demonstrating the clinical utility of exploring hidden memories. The chapter on "Somopsychosis and Psychoneurosis" shows that he has independently arrived at the distinction between the extrovert and the introvert. But he loses himself in a maze of repetition and inconsistency, and of speculation which poses as fact; these faults overpower the value of the actual observations recorded in the book.

MILLAIS CULPIN.

Therapeutic Immunization in Asylum and General Practice. By W. FORD ROBERTSON, M.D., Pathologist to the Scottish Asylums. Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingstone, 1921. pp. vii + 278.

Co-operation between the clinical psychologist on the one hand and the physiologist and pathologist on the other is essential to progress in the working out of the problems of nervous and mental disease. It is true that the development of histological methods in the last century raised false hopes of finding in the cells of nerve tissue the cause of all mental disorders; of a disease such as paranoia, for example, histology has taught us no more than it has, let us say, of the formation of political opinions or a dislike for tomatoes. But laboratory work has found a new field of research into the bodily accompaniments of emotion, and the close connection between the endocrine glands and emotional disturbance is proving of more than theoretical value, even if we are as yet unable to reach agreement as to what is cause and what effect.

We could possibly arrange the 'functional nervous disorders' in a series, at one end of which would appear those obsessional neuroses almost or entirely lacking in bodily disturbance—that is to say, purely mental in origin and symptomatology, and at the other end certain physical disturbances, digestive, respiratory or circulatory, in which there is a combination of toxic and mental causes.

In the study of such a combination the medical psychologist has an initial advantage, not of his own seeking, and one which he would rejoice to see equalised. He has had perforce to acquire a minimal knowledge of physiology and pathology and has at least a speaking acquaintance with the subjects of bacteriology and vaccine therapy; his knowledge of psychology and, to a great extent, of psychoneurotic disorders he has acquired outside his student curriculum. In no other speciality is the student at such a disadvantage, and although these disorders will form a fair proportion of the cases that the

practitioner will meet yet his knowledge of them frequently consists in the assumption that they consist of two diseases, hysteria and neurasthenia, the first being something akin to malingering, to be treated with moral advice and firmness, whilst the second is to be handled by hunting for some bodily disease which his one-sided training will allow him to treat. Of anxiety states and obsessional neuroses he has scarcely heard, and it is common enough to meet sufferers from these conditions who have been under lengthy treatment without their real symptoms ever being investigated.

As a result of this gap in medical education we find that clinical observations on the treatment of 'neurasthenia,' though of possible importance, are often valueless. According to recent publications neurasthenia has been cured by treating flat-foot or dilated stomach, or by excluding white bread from the diet, and we are familiar with the influence ascribed to errors of refraction and pyorrhoea, and the benefit derived from treating them. Unfortunately, we are left in ignorance of what the neurasthenia is—whether a state of fatigue, of anxiety, obsessions or what-not—and the clinical value of the reports is equal to reports of the cure of so many cases of 'fever.'

We might consider why 'neurasthenia,' which in the loose meaning of the word comprises so many cases the obstinate and persistent nature of which impresses the psychotherapist, should be the subject of claims to cure by the most diverse methods. Its variable nature in the individual case allows of amelioration by any treatment that provides relief from irritation or toxic influence, and the transitory nature of the amelioration may be overlooked, but the chief pitfall is probably to be found in the replacement of one symptom by another. An anxiety state is sometimes completely replaced by a definite physical symptom; or one symptom may be replaced by another of unrecognized psychical origin, as when headache with 'lack of concentration' is relieved by glasses and followed by 'gastritis,' the underlying condition, whatever it may be, remaining unrecognized. One sees patients in whom several organs have received attention, the result of treatment being satisfactory, but some new affection occurring as each one is 'cured'; these cases are examples of the cure of 'neurasthenic' conditions.

In Dr Ford Robertson's work we look for that co-operation with his psychological fellow-workers for which his position offers every advantage. Seeking for evidence of his being in touch with present-day views we read (p. 218) "The distinctive signs and symptoms of neurasthenia are capable of fairly precise definition, and there need rarely be any doubt, or difference of opinion, as to whether a particular case is to be classed as of this nature or not. The chief symptoms are a constant feeling of fatigue, not relieved by rest, and the occurrence of various forms of hyperaesthesia, paraesthesia and localised pain. Two important physical signs constantly occur—exaggeration of the patellar reflex and tremor of the eyelids when the eyes are half closed. Added to these, there are, in greater or less degree, characteristic mental features which constitute the picture of psychasthenia—namely, incoercible ideas, obsessions and monophobias."

This 'fairly precise definition' is disappointing. It places in one group the anergic victim of a hard world, the tremulous sufferer from an anxiety state, and the active and physically fit intellectual man who finds himself worried by obsessive doubts. The hysterical nature of many phobias prompts inquiry whether Dr Robertson places hysteria in this group, and on the next page the phrase "neurasthenia and all the psycho-neuroses" leaves us guessing what

are 'psycho-neuroses' as distinguished from the author's conception of neurasthenia.

The book is devoted largely to bacteriological theory and technique; immunization by autogenous vaccines is its main theme and in its general principles this is so fully and authoritatively accepted that it would be presumption to criticise it in this journal. The writer, however, departs from orthodoxy in attributing to certain diphtheroid organisms a pathological importance, especially in the production of neurasthenia. Other neurotoxic organisms are accountable for a great amount of mental and nervous disease. His evidence in regard to neurasthenia rests upon three statements: firstly, the finding of particular organisms in cases of neurasthenia; secondly, the aggravation of all the neurasthenic symptoms (p. 224) by overdoses of vaccine derived from the organism; and, thirdly, the benefit resulting from immunization.

The second statement is baldly put with no information as to what the symptoms are that are aggravated. Any lowering of bodily health may influence mental symptoms and most of us harbour organisms which, if grown in culture and injected as a vaccine, would produce at least malaise. In fact, experience of typhoid inoculation teaches that a vaccine derived from a bacillus presumably foreign to the patient can produce a severe reaction, and in the army the reviewer was familiar with cases in which the inoculation was followed by an outbreak of neurotic symptoms in men already predisposed to neurosis. The results claimed for vaccine therapy cannot be discussed in the absence of clinical information.

Dr Robertson seems to be aggrieved with his brother bacteriologists who reject his evidence concerning diphtheroid organisms, and (p. 219) protests against the total neglect, by certain writers, of bacterial toxic factors in the pathogenesis of neurasthenia: "They have done nothing to refute the evidence; they have simply ignored it."

His evidence in the case of Dementia Precox is as irrefutable, because of its elusiveness, as that concerning neurasthenia; six cases are described in which old friends like *streptococcus pyogenes* and *micrococcus catarrhalis* were found freely with their diphtheroid companion, and in one case recovery from 'dementia precox in its early phase' took place after a course of immunization.

Dr Robertson is plainly a man of independent opinions and with his skill in technique should be a valuable co-worker in our subject; but his attitude towards psychological research is unfortunate. Mind is "only a concomitant of a reaction in the psychical centres of the brain" and "such a view of the nature of mind has no place for the unconscious, or subconscious mind" (p. 221). Further, "The psycho-analysts are also in error in holding that a so-called subconscious suppressed complex can act as a pathogenic agent, disturbing the course of normal mentalization. Tanzi and Lugaro have dwelt upon this error and exposed it."

The phrase "subconscious suppressed complex" suggests that its user has no first-hand acquaintance with the literature. There have been many confirmations of and contributions to the theory of the unconscious since Tanzi and Lugaro exposed its error in 1916.

One wishes that Dr Ford Robertson could recognise the present limitations of the purely physiological view of mental processes; in his own words, "Science demands that, in seeking to reach the truth regarding any of its problems, all the known factors shall be taken into consideration."

MILLAIS CULPIN.

Psycho-Analysis. By R. H. HINGLEY, B.A. Methuen & Co., 1921. pp. 185. 6s.

This is one of the legion of popular works on this subject that are now falling from the press like leaves in autumn. The enthusiastic and altruistic spirit in which it is written marks it out from many of them; it is a well-meant attempt to convey to others an idea of the benefits which a study of psycho-analysis may yield, and to indicate some of the means by which they may be obtained; and as such it engages interest and to some extent disarms criticism. But beyond some value of a propagandist nature it has little merit.

The aim of the book is stated to be "to give a plain account of psycho-analysis," but both this statement and the title are misleading in reference to its actual contents. For, quite apart from what he acknowledges to be his "sympathetic criticism," the writer has not been able to refrain from introducing views of his own as "psycho-analysis," and from consciously or unconsciously misrepresenting in a radical manner the conclusions of psycho-analysis. Where an adequate knowledge of the subject has not first been acquired, something of this kind is probably inevitable, no matter how fair and honest a writer's intentions may be.

A great and evidently quite sincere show of fairness to psycho-analysis is made throughout the book, with one exception, which curiously enough reveals itself as a 'displacement on to a detail' of the whole difficulty. In the matter of the uses of certain terms (*e.g.* unconscious, *Libido*, etc.) the writer repeatedly and unhesitatingly, without reason or argument, pronounces psycho-analysis to be "unpsychological" and leaves it at that. On p. 76 we find this attitude on the point clearly related to another attitude derived from academic psychology—namely, a depreciation of the place of affects in mental life and a desire to substitute for them some other force in mental dynamics. In consequence we find such a momentous question as that of the pleasure and reality principles handled with an airy sketchiness by which serious discussion is avoided; and in its place the writer does not hesitate to advance his own opinion, without any evidence, that the truth lies midway between Freud and McDougall. The whole book, in fact, is an expression of this subjectively-determined attempt at a compromise between psycho-analysis and academic psychology. The same thing is seen concerning 'anxiety'—a matter about which a very insufficient grasp of psycho-analytic views is evident, all the more inexcusable since this subject has been very fully dealt with in psycho-analytic literature. In regard to other important matters, *e.g.* symbolism, the homosexual stage of *Libido*-development, and above all the technique of treatment, definitely false statements are made.

As has been said, the spirit of the instructor and reformer breathes through the book; hence we are not surprised to find the allusions to the "aim of psycho-analysis" that are so common in this class of book, and the inevitable chapter or two on "psycho-analysis and education." It is necessary to reiterate that psycho-analysis has no aim, beyond that common to all science—the pursuit of knowledge with a view to the ultimate conversion of knowledge into power; the true mark of the scientific mind lies in the capacity to postpone such conversion and to pursue investigations until such time as they can render an unquestionable and not too costly service to the world. Freud and those best fitted to form opinions on this matter have been exceedingly guarded in expressing their views about the application of psycho-analysis to education.

But here, as so commonly, the importance of the "provision of opportunities for sublimation" is much exaggerated, and in general the writer gravely overestimates the parents' rôle, particularly in his insistence on the importance of "confidence" between parents and child in order that the child's unconscious may be open to the parents' influence. One sometimes cannot avoid a feeling of dismay about the fate of the children of this generation who will be subjected to the experimental handling of parents with a smattering of psycho-analysis. The old-fashioned God who knew all was alarming enough in the childhood of our grand-parents; a replacement of Him by the parent in the flesh would seem to close to our grand-children all avenues of escape from the horror. Those with any real knowledge of the truth of psycho-analysis—above all knowledge gained by experience and not from reading—are well aware that anything in the way of analysis of child by parent is impracticable and impossible, by reason of emotional factors on both sides. The advantages of analytic knowledge in the parent will be found in its application to the broad lines and general principles of training, and not to the opportunities it offers of prying into and "influencing" the child's mind. The parents' attention is mainly required in connection with the surrounding conditions; the child must develop itself.

In conclusion, it should be repeated that as a laudable and honest attempt to confer an acceptable benefit on the human race by means of a small dose of diluted psycho-analysis the book cannot be condemned, but that as a serious contribution, even to popular knowledge of the subject, it is negligible.

On the other hand, it may be hoped that it will arouse interest in some who may then be impelled to pursue their study further.

JOAN RIVIERE.

The Psychology of Medicine. By T. W. MITCHELL, M.D. Methuen & Co., Ltd. pp. 179. 6s. net.

Under this rather non-committal title the author gives a concise and closely reasoned account of all the modern developments of psychology as applied to medicine.

The book opens with an account of the work of the mesmerists and then passes on to a consideration of the phenomena of hypnotism and of hysteria. Janet's theory of dissociation is carefully expounded and the necessity for a more dynamic explanation of these conditions is demonstrated. This serves to introduce Freud's conception of repression. Psycho-analysis as a body of doctrine, as a method of psychological investigation and as a therapeutic instrument is then dealt with, special chapters being devoted to dreams and the unconscious. In the latter there is a very helpful attempt to unravel the rather confused terminology which clings to this aspect of psychology. The book closes with chapters on the various neuroses and on psycho-therapeutic procedures.

In covering all this ground, in what must be admitted to be an adequate manner, within the modest compass of 180 pages Dr Mitchell has achieved a real *tour de force*. The book is intended primarily for the use of "readers who have had no professional training in either medicine or psychology," or of those professional students who desire to make a "preliminary survey" of the

ground. The requirements of both these classes are not quite identical, but one must admit that Dr Mitchell has avoided, on the one hand, an altogether too cursory sketch, and, on the other, a too perplexing condensation of his subject-matter, and thus as nearly as possible meets the demands of both types of reader. He achieves this compromise largely through the successful use of the historical method in the earlier chapters. It has often been contended that the historical method of treatment is fatal to clear exposition, but the present volume illustrates what can be done not only to render the subject interesting but also to present it in a succinct and eminently readable fashion by regarding the subject to some extent from the point of view of its development.

The book can be heartily commended to those for whom it appears to have been written. Even those who have some acquaintance with the subject can find in Dr Mitchell's volume a very clear exposition of the fundamental principles of modern psychology as applied to medicine. Here they will find a wonderfully complete and orderly statement of all those essentials which otherwise can only be acquired by dint of strenuous application coupled with wide reading.

W. McALISTER.

Insanity and Mental Deficiency in Relation to Legal Responsibility. A Study in Psychological Jurisprudence. By WILLIAM G. H. COOK. xxiv + 192 pp. Routledge. 10s. 6d. net.

This treatise, which was approved as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Laws in the University of London, is an admirable survey of the law relating to torts, contracts and testamentary capacity as applied to the insane in the light of such precedents as exist. The law relating to the civil responsibility of lunatics has been generally admitted to stand upon very insecure foundation, and in this book Dr Cook has undertaken the task of setting out a statement of the law as declared by Statute or Courts of Justice, and also as in his opinion it ought to have been declared to be. To this end he has carefully examined upwards of 200 cases and the laws of many other countries for comparative purposes. Both for torts and contracts it is submitted that lunatics should be treated on the same footing as infants, as being incapable. The present law as to contracts, that the contracts of an insane person can only be avoided when the insanity can be shown to have been known to the plaintiff, is considered to be unsound in that the decision for the precedent rested upon other cases, which in fact were decisions as to contracts for necessities, and moreover the law relating to capacity of lunatics to marry does not follow out to its logical conclusion this ruling. No hard and fast rule is laid down as to testamentary capacity and the ruling that each case must be dealt with upon its own merits will find favour and support from psychiatrists. The book ends with two appendices: (1) a summary of chief powers and duties of lunacy and mental deficiency authorities in England and (2) suggestions for the reform of lunacy and mental deficiency administration. As regards the latter it would seem to be in the national interest, both from the point of view of efficiency and economy, if the maintenance of all pauper lunatics and feeble-minded persons was made a national charge, so as to do away with the law of settlement of paupers, their care and treatment being placed in the hands of a Central Authority.

The book is full of valuable information and should be of great assistance to all those who have to deal with the question of insanity. It might be objected by psychologists that its sub-title is hardly justified inasmuch as the psychological problems involved are scarcely touched upon, but for all that the conclusions are sound enough. And again most psychiatrists will still agree with Lord Blackburn that it is impossible to find a satisfactory definition of insanity though Dr Cook holds that it is now possible to give a definition which is both comprehensive and satisfactory, and they will also object to his broad use of the term 'mental deficiency,' which is now only used in the technical sense as being restricted to cases of innate deficiency which come under the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913.

E. PRIDEAUX.

ABSTRACTS.

The Group Mind. A sketch of the principles of collective Psychology, with some attempt to apply them to the interpretation of national life and character. By WILLIAM McDUGALL, F.R.S. Cambridge University Press, 1921. pp. xvi + 304.

This book is a sequel to the author's *Introduction to Social Psychology*, which was first published in 1908 and which has met with such widespread success. There can be little doubt that the present volume will be equally well, if not better, received by the general reading public. The two volumes together form what may be called a general system of Psychology and have established Prof. McDougall's position as a worthy successor of William James and as one of the leading psychologists of modern times.

In the earlier volume the foundations were laid of a science of the mind, doing equal justice to its biological and psychological aspects, and in the book before us we find McDougall applying the general principles thus acquired to the solution of the problem of the Group Mind. He makes it clear that, in his view, group psychology is not identical with sociology. The province of the latter science is much wider since it comprises contributions from other sciences such as climatology, epidemiology, physiology, genetics and economics, so far as they have bearing upon the life of individuals in society, whereas the more restricted task of group psychology is to examine

the conception of the collective or group mind, in order to determine whether and in what sense this is a valid conception; to display the general principles of collective mental life which are incapable of being deduced from the laws of the mental life of isolated individuals; to distinguish the principal types of collective mental life or group mind; to describe the peculiarities of those types and as far as possible to account for them....Some writers have assumed the reality of what is called the 'collective consciousness' of a society, meaning thereby a unitary consciousness of the society, over and above that of the individuals comprised within it. This principle is examined in Chapter II and provisionally rejected, but it is maintained that a society, when it enjoys a long life and becomes highly organised, acquires a structure and qualities which are largely independent of the qualities of the individuals who enter into its composition and take part for a brief time in its life. It becomes an organised system of forces which has a life of its own, tendencies of its own, a power of moulding all its component individuals and a power of perpetuating itself as a self-identical system subject only to laws of gradual change.

McDougall is able to conceive of group organisation as a form of mental unity because he regards the individual mind as most satisfactorily defined as "an organised system of mental and purposive forces" and in this sense it is clear that any social group might rightly be said to possess collective mind. His main reasons for denying the existence of a collective *consciousness* are two in number. First that it would involve the assumption that "the consciousness of the units is used twice over, once as an individual consciousness, once as an element entering into the collective consciousness; and no one has been able to suggest how this difficulty can be surmounted." Secondly, the analogy of an individual organism as the collective consciousness of its cells, with a

society as the collective consciousness of its units, breaks down in one very important respect. There is a spatial continuity of the cells in an individual organism which seems to be the essential condition of the fusion of the consciousness of the cells, whereas no such continuity exists among the individual units of the social group.

The central idea in McDougall's whole discussion is that of "organisation" and he brings out the essential importance of this conception by dealing in successive chapters with the "mental life of the crowd" and the "highly organised group." Even in the crowd a minimum of organisation is essential for it to become a psychological crowd.

There must be some degree of similarity of mental constitution, of interest and sentiment among the persons who form the crowd, a certain degree of mental homogeneity of persons who form the group and the higher the degree of this mental homogeneity of any gathering of men the more readily do they form a psychological crowd and the more striking and intense are the manifestations of collective life.

Under these conditions one of the most characteristic results of the formation of a crowd is the great exaltation or intensification of emotion produced. Individuals when in a crowd may have their emotions stirred to a pitch seldom attained under other circumstances; they feel carried out of themselves, caught up by their emotion and swept clear of feelings of individual limitation. One of the most characteristic intensifications of emotion in a crowd is the phenomenon of panic, and McDougall says panic is "the crudest and simplest example of collective life." He explains the intensification of emotion in a crowd by what he calls the principle of primitive sympathy.

The principle is that in man and in the gregarious animals generally each instinct with its characteristic primary emotion and its special impulse is capable of being excited in one individual by the expressions of the same emotion in another, in virtue of a special congenital adaptability of the instinct on its cognitive or perceptual side. In the crowd the expressions of fear of each individual are perceived by his neighbours and this perception intensifies the fear directly excited in them by the threatening danger.

In other cases again the intensification of emotional response may be explained by the fact that each member is aware of the crowd as a whole and conscious of his membership in that whole and thus loses his sense of individual responsibility, and gives himself up to the prevailing emotion without restraint. Dr Le Bon has compared this state of the individual merged for the time in the crowd in action to the state of fascination in which the hypnotised individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotiser. But as McDougall points out "crowds undoubtedly display great suggestibility but great suggestibility does not necessarily imply hypnosis; and there is no ground for supposing that the members of the crowd are thrown into any such condition save possibly in very rare instances." Finally, a crowd acts by impulse, not by volition, and in its lack of self-consciousness and sense of responsibility is comparable to "an unruly child or an untutored passionate savage in a strange situation."

Whereas the mentality of the individual tends to be lowered in a crowd, in more highly organised groups the result is less detrimental; indeed, with a sufficient degree of organisation, the group mind may rise to a level superior to that shown individually by most, if not by all, of the members of the group. McDougall enumerates five conditions which are of importance in raising the collective mental life to such a higher level. These conditions are (1) continuity of existence of the group; (2) some adequate idea in the mind of each of its

members of the nature of the group, its position, functions and capabilities and of the relations of the individuals to the group; in this way there may spring up within each individual member a *sentiment* for the group; that is, an organised system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of the group; (3) the interaction of the group with other similar groups animated by other ideals and purposes, especially if this interaction is in the form of conflict or rivalry. Such interaction greatly promotes the self-knowledge of each group; (4) "the existence of a body of traditions and customs and habits in the minds of the members of the group, determining their relations to one another and to the group as a whole"; (5) a differentiation and specialisation of the functions of its constituents, *i.e.* the organisation of the group.

McDougall has defined volition and distinguished it from simpler forms of conation by saying that it is "a reinforcement of any impulse or conation by one excited within the system of the self-regarding sentiment" and he has shown in his *Social Psychology* how the self-regarding sentiment may become extended to other objects than the individual self and to all objects with which the self identifies itself which are regarded as belonging to the self or as part of the ideal self. He is now able to show that any highly organised group such as the patriot army is capable of true collective volition or "general will" through the blending of the self-regarding sentiment of each individual with his sentiment of patriotism.

The science of collective volition is not merely the direction of the wills of all to the same end, but a motivation of the wills of all members of the group by impulses awakened within the common sentiment for the whole of which they are parts. It is the extension of the self-regarding sentiment of each member of the group to the group as a whole that binds the group together and renders it a collective individual capable of collective volition.

McDougall proceeds to show, with reference to different levels of cultural development, that the group self-consciousness or the group spirit is the great socialising agency. It destroys the opposition and conflict between the crudely individualistic and the primitive altruistic tendencies of human nature. Groups are not always mutually exclusive, and an individual may share in the self-consciousness of more groups than one so long as their natures and aims do not necessarily bring them into rivalry. This principle of multiple group consciousness in each individual is of the utmost importance, for

it allows the formation of a hierarchy of group sentiments for a system of groups in which each larger group includes the lesser; each group being made the object of the extended self-regarding sentiment in a way which includes the sentiment for the lesser group in the sentiment for the larger group in which it is comprised. Thus the family, the village, the county, the country as a whole, form for the normal man the objects of a harmonious hierarchy of sentiments of this sort, each of which strengthens rather than weakens the others and yields motives for action which on the whole co-operate and harmonise rather than conflict.

McDougall contrasts this with the collectivist ideal, as set out for example in Plato's *Republic*, which aims at developing in all members a sentiment of devotion to the whole while suppressing the development of sentiments for groups within the whole. In criticism of this plan McDougall writes

this sentiment for the all-inclusive group cannot be effectively developed save by way of development of the minor group sentiments and, though it may succeed with some persons, there will always be many who cannot grasp the idea of the larger whole sufficiently firmly and intelligently to make it the object of any strong and enlightened

sentiment of attachment; such persons will be left on the purely egoistic level whereas their energies might have been effectively socialised by the development of some less inclusive group consciousness.

The truth is that "the smaller groups harmonise more effectively than the larger groups the purely egoistic and the altruistic motives except, of course, in the case of those few persons who can play leading parts in the life of the larger group." If it be objected that the group spirit fosters rivalry and conflict the reply may be made that "the antagonism between men who are moved to conflict by the group spirit is less bitter than that between individuals who are brought into conflict by personal motives; for the members of each group or party, though they may wish to frustrate or even to destroy the other party as such, may remain benevolent towards its members individually."

The above is a brief summary of the first-third of McDougall's volume. The remaining two-thirds are devoted to the consideration of the national mind and character and the processes of their development. Although of the utmost value and interest they have not the same importance for medical psychology. The book teems with challenging statements and original points of view. Among so much that constitutes solid advance in psychological theory, one may single out for special emphasis the theories of individual and collective volition, which in their strict parallelism mutually confirm one another, and the conceptions of psychological organisation and group self-consciousness and self-knowledge. It is especially in these respects that the book is so much more satisfying than the brilliant commentary upon it which Freud has written under the title "Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse" (*Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag*, Leipzig, Wien, Zürich, 1921) from the point of view of his own Libido theory.

WILLIAM BROWN.

The Psychology of Day-dreams. By Dr J. VARENDONCK, with an Introduction by Prof. Dr S. FREUD. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1921. pp. 367.

The Psychology of Day-dreams is written in order to throw light on a part of the mechanism of thought which has hitherto been insufficiently investigated. The book, which is prefaced by an introduction by Freud, is addressed especially to English readers, the English being, in the author's opinion, of all nations the most interested in psycho-analysis.

Dr Varendonck's terminology, as Freud points out in the introduction, calls for some comment. He defines the day-dream as "the product of affective thinking on the fore-conscious level." Hence he employs the term "fore-conscious" thinking, to which Freud takes exception on the ground that day-dreaming does not owe its peculiarities to the circumstance that it proceeds fore-consciously. The term "affective" thinking, used later in the book, is also open to criticism, so too Bleuler's term "autistic" thinking. The author himself is alive to the ambiguities of his terminology, but considers it of secondary importance to his aim of detecting the nature of this special thought-mechanism. Freud prefers the term "freely-wandering" or "phantastic" thinking.

After a preliminary chapter on realistic as opposed to phantastic thinking, the book falls into two main parts: an analytical and a synthetical section,

while in the concluding chapter the author discusses the function of the day-dream and takes a brief survey of the difference between conscious and fore-conscious thinking.

The observations contained in the *analytical section* were, for the most part, made during the war, when the author was serving as interpreter with the British Army. He records some of his own day-dreams and the conclusions he reaches are the result of a thorough analysis of the chains of thought which he accustomed himself to retrace.

In the three successive chapters in which the genesis, contents and termination of such chains are considered, he shows that in every instance they originate in some emotionally emphasised memory, arising either from an outer stimulus or an inner perception, and that the progress of the chain is directed by a wish. The process is always accompanied by visual images, but includes also verbal thought-constructions and approaches more nearly to the dream process or to conscious, directed thinking, according as the one or the other element prevails. The last link is, like the first, a memory, and awakening from fore-conscious thought takes place under the influence of an affect or an external stimulus at a moment of mental passivity or "memory-drifting."

In the fore-conscious state we have at our disposal more recollections than in the conscious state; further, memory is no longer "an inert mass," but "a dynamic contrivance," which, like the "unlimited capacity for forgetting" which characterises the fore-conscious state, fulfils an active function in the formation of the day-dream.

The weaknesses of this mode of thinking are soon apparent. There is a marked unsteadiness due to the fascination exercised by memory and the fore-conscious cannot correct its mistakes or recall links in the associative chain. Further, the critical faculty is weakened: in the fore-conscious, hypothesis becomes reality, and errors and absurdities are perpetrated. True, a certain selective activity is shown (Dr Varendonck demonstrates that the thought proceeds by a succession of suppositions advanced to meet the desired end), but, where there is evidence of sound critical judgment, we may suppose that there is a rising towards the level of consciousness.

The difference between day-dreams and night-dreams is only briefly touched upon, but we are told that "the impressions left by a day-dream and a night-dream respectively, although they defy description, are indeed very different to a careful observer." Possibly the difference depends on the relative awareness of accompanying gratification.

The latent content of the day-dream is not referred to and the relation of fore-conscious to unconscious wishes is mentioned only in passing.

In the *synthetical section*, Dr Varendonck discusses the part played by affect in the mechanism of fore-conscious thought-activity, which he treats under the heads of memory, apperception and ideation. He regards affect as forming the active connection between memory and perception: "in fore-conscious thinking the relation between memory and affect is causative—affects may stimulate recollection: conversely, remembrances may provoke dormant affects."

Again, in apperception affect is of supreme importance and its intervention may give rise to erroneous perceptions or, by a protraction of the apperceiving process, to chains of fore-conscious associations.

In the chapter on ideation and affect it is shown that, as there is a

centripetal form of affect leading to perception, so there is a centrifugal form leading to conception. Fore-conscious thought is directed by a wish and a wish is feeling applied to an end.

The relation of fore-conscious to conscious attention and that of wish to will are discussed at some length. Fore-conscious attention is defined as "the manifestation of the wish when it bears upon a fore-conscious perception." In consciousness, on the other hand, attention does not necessarily coincide with interest or perception. "In fore-conscious attention...a connection has been established between affect and intellect, which leads to the fore-conscious awareness of a memory element in the forum of the mind." Strictly speaking, awareness implies consciousness. The fore-conscious awareness of the author might be described as that susceptibility of the fore-conscious which promotes thought activity as the result of a stimulus not consciously perceived.

Passing to the discussion of wish and will, Dr Varendonck defines will as "an acknowledged wish which has become conscious," volition having taken over the rôle of affect in the control of our mental processes. In his subsequent definition of will as the awareness of our power to use mental energy (freed of affect) for achieving a conscious purpose—a definition which includes the function of conscious attention and the process of conscious repression—the essentially dynamic nature of will seems to be somewhat lost sight of.

In the chapter dealing with intuition and repression and their relation to mental evolution, intuition is regarded as the reverse of repression; for, while the latter clears the field of consciousness at the expense of the fore-conscious, intuition is an invasion into consciousness of fore-conscious modes of thinking.

The inhibitory aspect of affect is not considered, nor its relation to repression, and the differentiation of affects accompanying memory traces is superficial.

Of special interest to the general reader are the views put forward with regard to fore-conscious thinking in relation to creative thought, to visualisation and to the mechanism of insomnia.

Tracing the evolution of thought processes, the author shows how there has been a progressive separation of the mental processes and the motor system. In fore-conscious thinking the two are interdependent; only in voluntary thinking are we able to separate at will intellection from motor reaction. All thought is to be regarded as an attempt at adaptation under the authority of the pleasure principle.

"This investigation," concludes Dr Varendonck, "tends to establish that the unconscious, fore-conscious and conscious thought-processes are three manifestations, varying only in degree, of the same function. This function, originally regulating the relations of the individual with the outer world, constitutes a manifestation of universal energy and is as eternal and unceasing as the other organic activities in the service of adaptation."

CECIL M. BAINES.

Zur Psychologie der Amputierten: Ein Beitrag zur praktischen Psychologie. By NARZISS ACH. pp. 30. 1920. Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann. Leipzig.

Illustrated almost entirely by references to amputations of the arm. Falls into the following sections:

I. *The patient in hospital.* Psychological effects of amputation. (a) General depression with loss of courage and desire for life. (b) Inhibition of general motor activity. (c) Tendency to withdraw from reality, accompanied by physical and mental sense of loss of personal worth.

This condition has to be met by diverting the patient's thoughts from himself. This is attempted by various methods. (1) Providing books, lectures, entertainments, etc. (2) Providing work to rekindle his interest in life. (3) Placing him with other patients who have also suffered amputation.

Effect of amputation on different temperaments. Three groups. (1) Those who give up completely and consider that the State should support them. (2) Those who are determined that their condition shall not unfit them for life. (3) The largest group which comes between these two. The higher the degree of education, the easier it is to renew the interest in life.

Psychogenic muscle exercises. The patient is directed to think that he is making certain movements in the lost limb. This brings into play the muscles which remain in the stump and the body. *Paraesthesia* in patients suffering from amputation.

II. *The patient and the artificial limb.* The patient should be allowed as much choice as possible in order to get him to use the limb. His psychology should be taken into account in the choice of the artificial limb and of the occupation for which it is designed and he is to be trained. If possible, it should enable him to return to his former occupation. Various types of limbs. Where the patient has to move muscles to work them, the movements should correspond to those to which his brain was accustomed in moving the real limb. Considerations of fatigue and strain of attention.

III. *The patient and his will to work.* "Pension-fear." Care should be taken not to put him into occupation for which he is unsuited. An occupation where he is his own master is best. Necessity of providing an artificial limb soon.

C. M. B.

Psychodiagnostic: Methodik und Ergebnisse eines wahrnehmungs-diagnostischen Experiments (Deutenlassen von Zufallsformen). By Dr HERMANN RORSCHACH. pp. 174. 1921. Ernst Bircher, Verlag in Bern und Leipzig.

Dr Rorschach describes the methods and results of a psychological experiment, first attempted in 1911, the object of which is to arrive at a diagnosis of the subject's mentality by causing him to interpret certain indeterminate figures with which he is presented.

These figures are produced by blots or smudges upon sheets of paper and the experiment is conducted with ten such sheets, the results in the various cases, both of normal and abnormal persons, being carefully compared. Points noted during the experiment are: the distinctness with which the figure is perceived, the relation between the kinaesthetic factor and that of colour, the apprehension of the figure as a whole or in parts, etc.

From the different modes in which the figures are perceived certain psychological types emerge, broadly divided by the author into (a) *types of apprehension* (or intelligence), and (b) *types of experience* (or reaction of life).

(a) Under types of apprehension he distinguishes abstract thinkers, practical men, men of imagination, and so forth, recognised by the so-called "components" of intelligence, e.g. concentration.

(b) Types of experience are determined by the relation between the subject's extraversive and intraversive tendencies, as evidenced in the relation of his perceptions of colour and movement in the test-sheets.

These relations indicate also the labile or stable affectivity of the subject, a preponderating kinaesthesia indicating stability, and the preponderance of colour-perception a labile affectivity.

Correlatives with the "experience-type" are found in certain components of intelligence, conditions of affectivity, characteristics, talents, modes of perception, and types of hallucination and of neurotic or psychotic affections—these functions and phenomena being subject to the oscillations in the "experience-type," due to depression, elation, fatigue, etc.

By means of the experiment, variations in the type may be observed and comparisons drawn in the case of individuals and of different sexes, families or races.

The type, however, merely signifies a form of reaction to, or equipment for, life. Action and content are determined by impulse and trained thinking, and the author points out that such thinking is largely opposed to the capacity for experience. He considers that the experiment has real diagnostic value, whether in estimating the personality of normal people, or in discovering the nature of a psychosis or neurosis. Further, a test of almost universal applicability is provided for conditions of intelligence and affectivity. The book closes with numerous examples, this section including some observations on the relation of the "form-experiment" to psycho-analytic work.

C. M. B.

Psychopathologie der Ausnahmestände und Psychopathologie des Alltags. By Dr ERWIN STRANSKY. Ernst Bircher, Verlag in Bern und Leipzig. Price: Fr. 2, 75.

In accordance with the aims of an *applied* psychiatry, as stated by him some years ago, the author endeavours to turn to valuable account for the psychology of normal mental processes theories and scientific findings drawn from the psychopathology of abnormal conditions. By this route he arrives at a special conception of the fundamental mental processes in the various abnormal conditions. Deviating somewhat from prevailing views, he regards what is so often looked upon as a "dissociation" or "doubling" of the mental personality as essentially a kind of displacement. The author examines the problem on the one hand from the clinical, and on the other from the psychological, point of view, and by way of individual psychology he takes the opportunity to pass into the realm of social and folk-psychology. Here is ground in many directions unbroken as yet by applied psychology, soil which, as the author emphatically asserts, will yield a rich harvest to those who in the future till it.

While not actually making use in this paper of psycho-analytic considerations, the attitude of the author is by no means one of hostility to, or rejection of, serious, critical psycho-analysis, but he energetically repudiates the more recent attempts to reform psychology from the side of philosophy, regarding them as the very opposite of applied psychiatry.

C. M. B.

NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS.

ANNALES MEDICO-PSYCHOLOGIQUES (Series XI—Vol. 1).

No. 1. January 1921.

Rapports des commotions de guerre et de la constitution émotive. (Dr H. Le Savoureux.)

Does the physical shock produced on the battlefield itself give birth to hyper-emotional symptoms through mere mechanical disturbance of the nervous system, without the aid of simultaneous emotional shock or predisposition? Some 200 cases are dealt with.

A propos de la "folie religieuse." (Dr Ch. Ladame.)

Two groups are distinguished: (1) in which the delirious ideas and hallucinations merely reflect the religious belief of the subject; (2) in which the cause is a psychical trauma (most often of a sexual nature).

Contribution à l'étude des formes psychiques de la poliomyélephalite épidémique. (M. Louis Livet.)

Two cases are discussed, the main result arrived at being the diagnostic value of temperature.

Des délires alcooliques à la suite des mesures législatives et administratives prises pendant la guerre. (Dr de Clérambault.)

Statistics are given showing great diminution in number of cases, as a result.

De la mimique hallucinatoire et du diagnostic de l'hallucination auditive verbal. (M. Quercy.)

Three cases are dealt with in which the subject, seemingly, denies to his hallucinatory experiences any sensory content.

No. 2. February 1921.

Rapports des commotions de guerre et de la constitution émotive. (Dr H. Le Savoureux.) (Continuation from No. 1.)

A propos de la "folie religieuse." (Dr Ch. Ladame.)

(Also continuation from No. 1.)

Délire érotique avec perversion sexuelle. (Ph. Chaslin et P. Chatelin.)

An interesting account of a case over a period showing several relapses after improvement; in which also remarkable literary ability, foreign to the normal personality, was shown.

Contribution à l'étude comparée des divers traitements actuels de l'épilepsie. (J. Roubinovitch et J. Lauzier.)

A record of experimentation with various drugs.

Syphilis héréditaire et épilepsie. (M. R. Leroy.)

Record of a case of epilepsy completely cured by novarsénobenzol.

Encéphalite épidémique asthénique et myoclonique avec crises bulbaires. Évolution continue depuis plus d'un an. (MM. Raoul Leroy et Roger Dupouy.)

An interesting record of a case leading to the conclusion that "l'agent pathogène" gains entry to the infundibular region and floor of the 3rd ventricle *via* the nasal passages.

No. 3. March 1921.

La manie chronique. (M. Laignel-Lavastine et Jean Vinchon.)

A description of symptoms with emphasis of the importance of physical symptoms in diagnosis, and that the term 'chronic' does not necessarily imply incurability.

De la kleptomanie au point de vue médico-légal. (Dr August Wimmer.)

A criticism of the position that 'true kleptomania, if it exists at all, is a pathological rarity.'

Mesures de la tension artérielle au cours d'états dépressifs. (Dr H. Beaudouin.)

The conclusion is reached that hypertension is in all cases due to organic trouble.

Le tréponème pâle est-il l'agent causal de la paralysie générale? (L. Marchand.)

He favours the negative—the cause has yet to be found.

No. 4. April 1921.

Le rôle de l'habitude dans la colonisation familiale des aliénés. (Dalmas et Vinchon.)

An interesting discussion with suggestion as to use of "family houses," where conditions will be semi-normal, in treatment of recovering patients.

L'œuvre du dispensaire des maladies mentales à Stockholm. (Dr V. Wigert.)

Emphasis should be laid upon the great need for treatment of cases of worry and slight mental disorder, as in this dispensary.

Délire de négation terminé par guérison—considérations sur l'hypochondrie et la mélancolie. (F. Tissot.)

Neurasthenia, hypochondria and melancholia are three forms of the same depressive psycho-neurosis; in all three is found evidence of psychic predisposition, and, objectively, disturbing preoccupation as to the bodily, the mental, or the moral self.

Écrits ironiques d'un paranoïaque halluciné. (Dr F. Usse.)

A low form of humour, immoral and morbid, which may be considered a special perversion of the social instincts.

Un cas de psychose maniaque dépressive à un jour d'alternance. (A. Starobinski.)

A case of 30 years' standing.

Mutisme acquis et persistant chez un enfant de 13 ans. (Alfred Gordon.)

An interesting account of a case where total dumbness followed the reading of a story about dumbness, and in which the psychic character of the child was completely changed.

Sur la nature de la démence survenant au cours de certains délires (à propos de deux cas de délire d'influence). (Dr M. Migrard.)

Hallucinations lilliputiennes, délire et puérilisme. (M. E. Martmor.)

No. 5. May 1921.

Les formes verbales de l'interprétation délirante. (Dr Paul Guiraud.)

Two kinds of cases are discriminated: (1) in which the conclusions have logical justification, and are due to a prevailing affective state which produces "polarisation" of association of ideas and association of words or syntheses, (2) in which the conclusions have not logical justification, and are due to an organisation of the elements of the central theme according to different laws from those of ordinary psychology, the dominating factor being intensity of "affective potential."

Note sur quelques cas anormaux de mélancolie. (Ph. Chaslin, P. Chatelin, I. Meyerson.)

An account of three cases.

Encéphalite épidémique et divorce (contribution à l'étude médico-légale des formes mentales de l'encéphalite épidémique). (M. Georges Petit.)

A woman about to be married became melancholic, declaring she was not fit to marry. Under medical treatment she recovered, but three weeks later relapsed. The marriage took place although she objected. No improvement followed and the husband applied for divorce. The Society discussed the case.

Sur un cas de délire d'interprétation. (Xavier Abély.)

An alcoholic suffered from delusion that his wife was unfaithful. The delusion increased in strength, especially after he became blind. The relative responsibility of diabetes, alcoholism and heredity for his misfortune is discussed.

JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE

(XVIII^e année).

No. 1. January 1921.

Sur le psychisme inconscient (1) (Fr. Paulhan).

Mental processes, as perception and recognition, which are usually classed as 'conscious' processes may be carried on without any conscious awareness. That which is acquired in this manner unwittingly differs in nowise from that which is obtained unwittingly and may be available to consciousness. That which is perceived, without conscious awareness may later be recognised consciously as known.

Le rire (G. Dumas).

Five problems are dealt with: (1) The anatomical and physiological mechanisms of laughter; (2) Laughter as a psychological state—laughter from pleasure and laughter from perception of the comic are distinguished, the former being a general *joie de vivre*; (3) The basis of the comic—theories from Aristotle to Bergson discussed; (4) The psycho-physical mechanism by which perception produces laughter; (5) Laughter as a social language.

La conscience et la conscience du moi (H. Wallon).

The evolution of self-consciousness from consciousness of an external 'reality.' When full self-consciousness is not attained or is lost—e.g. in the infant, imbecile and chloroformed subject—there is a tendency to exteriorise personal reminiscences. In contrast, the 'self' of fully developed self-consciousness transcends all spatial limitations.

Une adaptation biologique du Freudisme aux psychonévroses de guerre—L'instinct et l'inconscient de Rivers (H. Piéron).

A detailed review with sense criticisms the principal one of which is that to see in the psychoneuroses an effort of the organism to regain mental equilibrium may suit Freudian metaphysics but is out of harmony with the spirit of modern biology.

No. 2. February 1921.

De l'automatisme dans l'imitation (H. Delacroix).

Imitation at various levels from voluntary imitation to purely reflex automatic mechanical imitation—its development and relation to language and perception.

Les oscillations de l'activité mentale (P. Janet).

A brief outline of a course of study extending from 1918 to 1920.

Sur le psychisme inconscient (2) (Fr. Paulhan).

The supposed difference between unconscious mental activity and conscious mental activity is largely a metaphysical creation. Unconscious processes can be fully described in the same terms as conscious processes.

Sur le phénomène du déjà-vu (A. Gilles).

A short note in support of the view that explanation is to be found in the conscious recognition of things previously perceived subconsciously.

Contribution à l'étude de l'instinct: comportement de quelques araignées (Et. Rabaud).

Concludes that certain behaviour of certain spiders cannot be classified fairly as either instinctive or intelligent.

No. 3. March 1921.

Théorie de la perception (B. Bourdon).

Perception in general—perception of space—visual space—visual perception of movement—auditory space—development of perception of space.

L'orientation lointaine (Ed. Claparède).

Work on the ability of animals to move towards a place apparently desired but not yet an object of perception—the '*homing instinct*' etc.—is reviewed and the conclusion reached that the problem is very complex and needs more elucidation.

La folie, pensée organique (A. Hesnard).

Mental and nervous disorders have always a primary organic basis. Application of the notion of the unconscious in psychiatry has given valuable results but tends to obscure the organic origin of mental disorders. 'Psychognomonie' is suggested, as the title of a psychological technique to explore the *total* mental content, in place of "psycho-analysis employed by Freud and his school in the arbitrary and illegitimate sense of the psychological analysis of sexuality."

Caractère individuel et aliénation mentale (W. Boven).

The character of those predisposed to mental disorder. Relation of type of character to type of disorder. Predisposition in relation to characters of ancestors.

La réticence (P. Courbon).

An analysis of the forms and use of reticence in insanity.

R. I. B.

ARCHIVES SUISSES DE NEUROLOGIE ET DE PSYCHIATRIE

(An extract from Vol. VIII, No. 1).

Sur les reactions musculaires d'ordre affectif. Leur relation avec les mouvements volontaires et les mouvements réflexes. (W. van Woerkom.)

Seeks the cause of emotional reactions in the study of motor reactions. Distinguishes two groups of muscular reactions: (1) limited to region stimulated (emotional), (2) adapted towards an end. Discusses emotional reactions of young children and pathological cases. In pathological cases emotion inhibits voluntary action. Motor reactions not directed towards an end have probably been useful in evolution. Affirms that a primitive component of feeling is common to the reactions of those suffering from functional diseases of the brain and normal individuals and that general diffused reactions are the expression of purposive action in which the primitive factors have got the upper hand.

R. I. B.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS.

1921. Part I.

INTERNATIONALE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHO-ANALYSE.

1921. Part I.

The main contribution in this number of the *Journal* is an important article by Ferenczi on the subject of "Tic" (*tic convulsif*). Its interest lies in the fact that the subject has been little explored, and the position of these symptoms in relation to other mental or physical disorders has not hitherto been ascertained. Ferenczi's remarks are put forward tentatively, with a view to stimulating further observations and exploration of the subject, and are not advanced as final conclusions in any way. Nevertheless the main lines of his suggestions are sufficiently convincing to awake considerable interest and to justify an approximately definite position in relation to the other neuroses being accorded to this malady.

Various observations led to the supposition that tics have something to do with narcissism; this is supported by the reflexion that, although automatic, they constitute a preoccupation with the subject's *own body*, or a hyperaesthesia followed by a defence-reflex (of which a normal example would be the scratching of a pimple). It appears further that narcissistic and infantile traits have been clearly recognised as characteristic of sufferers from tic quite independently of psycho-analysis. Ferenczi gives reason for his belief that tics and stereotypies have a common origin and are essentially one phenomenon; the connection with onanism is brought out, many stereotypies evincing themselves under analysis as "equivalents of onanism"

—auto-erotism of course has an obvious connection with narcissism. The similarities and differences between this symptom and those of conversion-hysteria are referred to, the latter being described as “an auto-erotic symbolization of an object-relationship.” (Incidentally, an elucidation of the mechanism of the hysterical “leap from the mental to the physical” is given in this article, the first, we believe, to appear in psycho-analytic literature.) Tics, on the contrary, seem to have no relation to an external object, but to be derived either from constitutional narcissism, or from the secondary form of it conditioned by physical traumata—as when twitching of the eye-lids supervenes on a conjunctivitis. The narcissistic origin suggests a relation to the psychoses, and the author propounds a theory of the interesting connections between tic and catatonic conditions. Another link is shown in the connections between echolalia, tics, and what Freud has called the ‘organ-speech’ of narcissistic psychotics. Like all the author’s work, the article is condensed in form and the presentation entirely without superfluities; it succeeds brilliantly in its design of drawing attention to an important subject which will evidently repay closer investigation.

Berkeley-Hill contributes “A Short Study of the Life and Character of Mohammed,” which is rendered unnecessarily obscure by presuming an acquaintance with the life of Mohammed on the part of the reader. It has considerable interest, however, on account of the light thrown on the unconscious forces at work in the religion Mohammed bequeathed to “one-fourth of the human race.” The difficulties of dealing with Islam might well be lightened by a sympathetic understanding of the psychological factors behind its bewildering manifestations, especially since a peculiarly ambivalent attitude towards authority appears to be the essential element in them.

The Nicene creed of the Christian Church is the subject of a rather elementary analytic study by Cavendish Moxon. A mass of quite interesting interpretations, however, will be found put forward in too incoherent and cursory a manner. There follow some minor communications on the analytic interpretation of points in dreams.

Five of the extremely valuable Collective Reviews of recent literature on various subjects, which form a feature of this *Journal*, are contained in this number—namely, on the Unconscious, the Science of Religion, on Aesthetics and the Psychology of the Artist, on Mythology, and on Dream-Interpretation. There are also important book reviews, notably on Lipschütz’s work on the *Puberty Glands and their Effects* (1919).

The first number of the *Zeitschrift* for 1921 contains two papers delivered before the Hague Congress in 1920 by Jelgersma and Stärcke. There is also the second part of Boehm’s contribution on Homosexuality contained in the previous number, which offers a very illuminating and entertaining analysis of a recent German pamphlet on a proposed method of dealing with prostitution in large cities, again showing the extremely close unconscious association existing between homosexual tendencies and prostitution.

J. R.

ARCHIV FÜR KRIMINOLOGIE (KRIMINALANTHROPOLOGIE UND KRIMINALISTIK).

Edited by Dr ROBERT HEINDL. Vol. 73, Nos. 3 and 4, 1921.
Verlag von F. C. W. Vogel. Leipzig.

This number contains an article by Dr Wilhelm Ostwald of Leipzig on “The place occupied by Criminology in the whole body of Science.” Taking as his basis the theory of Comte, according to which it is possible to deduce the internal structure of a given science from its position in the whole structure of scientific knowledge, Dr Ostwald presents a schematic arrangement of this structure in general and of criminology in particular. His system is as follows. 1. Mathetics: (a) Logic, (b) Mathematics, (c) Geometry and Kinematics. 2. Energetics: (d) Mechanics, (e) Physics, (f) Chemistry. 3. Biotics: (g) Physiology, (h) Psychology, (i) Sociology. Applying this system to criminology, he concludes that this science in its most restricted sense falls under the

heading 3 i (Sociology) and represents the synthesis of all other branches of criminological science.

In an article entitled "The Criminal Police System and Anthropology," Arthur Macdonald of Washington discusses how far police records, and in particular the results of technical methods of identification, *e.g.* the taking of finger-prints, may serve the purpose of anthropological research.

Professors Allfeld and Beling and Dr Max Alsberg (barrister-at-law in Berlin) contribute papers criticising a treatise by Dr Robert Heindl on "Special Treatment of Habitual Criminals," being a supplementary proposal to the most recent German Criminal Procedure Bill. Dr Heindl recommends that in the new criminal procedure account be taken of the political revolution and that the rights of the accused and of his counsel be extended, while special rights (of arrest and search) be accorded to the State in the case of proved habitual criminals. The proposal is intended as a compromise, for the time of transition from old to new, which shall reconcile the most liberal general policy with the requirements of a sound policy of criminal law.

Prof. Mittermaier treats from the point of view of criminal jurisprudence the subject of the employment of means to procure abortion.

The *Journal* contains further the following articles: "Necrophilia and Necrosadism," by J. P. L. Hulst (University of Leyden). "The Value for Criminal Psychology of Recent Researches in the subject of Internal Secretion," by Dr M. H. Goring. "Attempted Murder with Pathogenic Bacteria," by Dr Lempp. "Ill-Treatment of Children," by Dr F. Siegfried (Public Prosecutor in Switzerland), and various notices and reviews of German, English, American, French, Spanish and Italian books and journals.

C. M. B.

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The *British Journal of Psychology* is issued by the British Psychological Society and will henceforth be published in two Sections, a *General Section* and a *Medical Section*. Each *Section* will appear in parts quarterly, the size and price of each part varying with the amount of material available.

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